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ABSTRACT
This paper makes use of the simulation results of 12 leading large
international econometric models, as to the effects of commonly specified
changes in monetary and fiscal policy, conducted under the Brookings exercise
"Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economies." The first half of
the paper examines disagreement among the models on the signs of policy
multipliers, and how such disagreement compares to the ambiguities appearing
in the theoretical literature. There turns out to be relatively little
disagreement as to the effects on output, prices and the exchange rate. The
greatest disagreement is rather over the question whether a monetary expansion
worsens or improves the current account.
The second half of the paper examines the implications for international
macroeconomic policy coordination. The existing literature makes the
unrealistic assumption that policy—makers all know the true model, from which
it follows that the Nash bargaining solution is in general superior to the
Nash competitive solution. But everything changes once we recognize that
policy—makers' models, as the models in the Brookings simulations, differ
from each other and therefore from the "true" model. When the central bank
and fiscal authorities subscribe to conflicting models, it is still true that
(1) the competitive equilibrium is sub—optimal, and that (2) the two authorities
will in general be able to agree on a cooperative policy package that each
believes will improve the objective function; however, (3) the bargaining
solution is as likely to move the target variables in the wrong direction as
in the right direction, in the light of a third true model. Out of 1,210
possible combinations of different models subscribed to by the two policy
authorities and models representing reality, bargaining raises welfare in
only 819 cases. The conclusion is that disagreement as to the true model may
be a more serious obstacle to successful policy coordination than is institu-




Berkeley, CA 94720An easy way for an outsider to tell when an academic discipline
has not yet ascertained "the truth" of a question is when Its practi-
tioners each give different answers. We know that we as tnacroeconomists
have not yet ascertained "the truth," if there was previously any doubt
on this score, when we look at the great divergence in forecasts as to
the effects of carefully—specified policy changes in the Brookings simu—
lation exercise "Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Economies".
The probability that a given model is correct is small when the number
of models giving different answers is large. Furthermore it is unlikely
that we will ever discover the true model; the number of different
models and the way models keep changing over time is evidence of this
proposition, and it seems inherent in the nature of social science.
There are three ways research can proceed. The first is for the
researcher at each point in time to maintain that he or she has now
discovered the one true model, and that all other models are wrong. The
second is for the researcher, while continuing to speak the language
that suggests his model is the one true one, to recognize implicitly
that this language is merely a convenient shorthand. The third is to
focus explicitly on the simultaneous co—existence of conflicting models.
The second research strategy is the best one to pursue for most
economic problems. The econometrician knows that his parameter esti-
mates are not exactly correct. More generally, all modellers know that
their models must be incomplete and misspecified. Nevertheless, if the
economist is good, the errors in his model will be such that, even if
—1—they could be correctly handled, it would not much change his forecasts
(in the case of an econometric forecasting model) or the conceptual
point he is trying to make (in the case of a theoretical model). While
it may be useful for the modeller to have explored as many extensions as
possible in appendices and such, there is not a need for him to be able
to claim that he has exhausted the truth. Nor is there a need for him,
on the other hand, to make frequent disclaimers; the readers will
understand that the model is not to be taken as literal truth.
These issues become most salient where, as in most modern macro-
economic models, agents in the proposed model must make decisions based
on expectations formed on the basis of some model of their own. The
rational expectations assumption is, of course, the assumption that the
model used by the agents is the same as the proposed larger model. As
soon as we admit that——because intelligent people are observed to
believe in conflicting models——we cannot claim that the proposed larger
model necessarily is literal truth, it follows that we cannot claim that
agents' models must necessarily be literally identical to the proposed
larger model. But, again, for most economic problems, especially those
involving the microeconomic decisions of private agents, one can make a
case that there is little to be gained by explicitly focusing on diver-
gent models. The assumption that the agents know the one true model
will continue to be an attractive modelling strategy.
When the decision makers are governments and the decision vari-
ables are macroeconomic policies, the case for assuming that everyone
knows the one true model is less compelling. In the first place, there
—2—is no powerful force like the marketplace to discipline governments who
use incorrect models. In the second place, the Federal Reserve Board's
MCM model, the Japanese EPA model, the OECD Interlink model, etc., are
the best that these government agencies have, and we can see that these
models conflict. One can argue that inicroeconomic agents have access to
specific knowledge of a common model unavailable to the macroeconomist.
It would be more difficult for a inacroeconomiist at a government agency
to argue that his or her own agency has access to knowledge of a common
model unavailable to the macroeconomist himself.'
The subject of this paper is the international econometric
models' conflicting estimates of the effects of macroeconomic
policies. To focus the discussion, we limit the policy variables to
each country's money supply and level of government expenditure. The
framework of policy variables and targets can thus be represented:
Y =U+ VIM C
Gb]'
'This is not to make the naive mistake of thinking thatpolicy
makers put complete faith in the models of the macroeconomists at their
own agencies, nor that the latter necessarily have access to the latest
data and thoughts of the former. But policy makers, at best, base their
thinking on models——whether developed by government, academic or
corporate institutions——similar to those in the Brookings modelling
exercise. (For example, British macroeconomic policy under Thatcher may
have been based on a model closer to the Liverpool model, which appears
in this exercise, than to any models previously existing at the U.K.
Treasury or Bank of England.) Policymakers, more likely, base their
thinking on "models" that conform even less to each other or to truth
than do the models of macroeconomists.
—3—where Y is a vector of output levels and other policy variables of
interest to the two countries, V is a matrix of policy multipliers,
Ma and Ga are the domestic money supply and government expenditure
and M.D and Gb are the foreign money supply and government expendi-
ture.
The project is divided into three major parts. Part I examines
how the reduced form policy multipliers, the entries in matrix V above,
are determined by more fundamental economic parameters such as the
degree of capital mobility, money demand elasticities, etc. This exami-
nation includes (a) the divergent multipliers one would expect to get
from the standard theoretical models that appear in the literature,
(b) the divergent multipliers that emerge from the simulations in the
Brookings modelling simulation exercise, (c) an attempt to interpret (b)
in terms of (a).
The other two parts of the project show what can happen in
standard policy—making problems when one policy maker bases his actions
on one of the available macroeconomic models, and another policy maker
bases his on another model, neither of which is necessarily the correct
model. It is shown that the usual finding of the popular literature on
macroeconomic policy coordination——that is, that policy—making is
necessarily improved if policy makers coordinate——does not hold if
policy makers base their actions on conflicting models.
In Part II we consider two domestic policy makers: the monetary
authority and the fiscal authority. We also limit the policy targets at
first to output and the current account balance to get a two—target,
—4—two—instrument framework. We begin with the case in which the policy
makers have common goals and the only coordination issue arises out of
divergent models. If the fiscal authority can believe any of the N
models, the monetary authority can believe any of the N models, and
the true world can be represented by any of the N models, then there
are N3 possible combinations. We show that when the two policy makers
coordinate, the common welfare function is improved relative to the Nash
competitive equilibrium in only 98 out of 180 combinations. Then in the
appendix we move to the usual case where goals diverge. The fiscal
authority seeks to maintain internal balance and the monetary authority
external balance or vice versa. This is the classic assignment
problem. As in the case of common goals, the qualitative answer changes
when the policy makers disagree on the correct model.
In the third part of this project, which will appear as a sepa-
rate paper, we consider the more complex problem of international policy
coordination. In studying coordination among four sets of policy
makers, monetary and fiscal authorities both domestically and abroad,
the policy targets will have to include three target variables, such as
output, the current account and inflation, the same three used by Oudiz
and Sachs (1984).2 Again, when models diverge, it is possible that
everyone will be worse off when policy makers do coordinate than when
they do not. Perhaps the main lesson of the paper is that when, for
alternative for the two—target, two—instrument framework would
be output and the exchange rate, which could be argued to span the three
targets.
—5—example, U.S. and European authorities fail to adopt an economist's plan
for Improving joint welfare by adopting a specific coordinated combi-
nation of policies, it may be because of divergent views as to what the
effects of those policy changes will be, rather than because of competi-
tive maximization of divergent goals.
—6—I. THE SOURCES OF
CONFLICTING POLICY MULTIPLIERS
We focus on the models' conflicting implications for the effects
of a change in fiscal policy, and the effects of a change in themoney
supply, in each case with the other policy variables (domestic and
foreign) held constant. The most well—known ambiguity is the question
of whether a fiscal expansion causes the domestic currency to appreciate
or depreciate. The other ambiguity that appears most commonly in the
theoretical literature is the effect of the exchange rate, and therefore
the effect of domestic fiscal (and monetary) policy, on foreign income.
The issue of whether transmission is positive or negative is of course
crucial to questions of international policy coordination. Somewhat
surprisingly, neither of these issues is the one on which the simula-
tions in the Brookings interdependent modelling exercise show the most
conflict. Most of the models show a fiscal expansion appreciating the
domestic currency and raising foreign output. The models are in much
greater disagreement on an issue that much of the literature considers
unambiguous: the effect of a domestic monetary expansion on the current
account and, via the trade linkage, on foreign output.
We begin by considering the standard theoretical two—country
model.
—7—I. 1. The Standard Two—Country Model
Since the model is so familiar, we circumscribe the algebra
tightly. Though we specify the equations in relatively general form, we
then proceed to consider only special cases.
(1) M/P =L(Y,i; j*) E
Ly>O
AL1<O L1< 0
(2) M/P =L(Y,i i) L>O X E L.<O L.<O
(3) Y =A(Y,1; SP*/P) + G + TB A>O A1<0
(4) y =A(Y,i; sp/p) + G* —TB A>0 A.<0
(5) TB =X(SP*/P)+ Y — X>0
(6) TB =—KA=K(ii;s—s) k K.I>O
(7) YIY =(P/)c:J
* *_*
(8) YIY =(P/P )
where M money supply






—8—Equations (1) and (2) give the money demand equations for the domestic
and foreign countries, respectively. We allow for the possibility that
foreign bonds compete with domestic bonds as an alternative to domestic
money in portfolios by including the other country's interest rate after
the semi—colon. Equations (3) and (4) show the demands for goods. We
allow for the possibility of a Laursen—Metzler effect, that a worsening
of the terms of trade would raise expenditure measured in domestic
units, by including the real exchange rate after the semi—colon.
Equation (5) gives the trade balance. Equation (6) gives the capital
outflow as a function of the nominal Interest differential, and possibly
of expected depreciation, where the latter is assumed to be a function
of the spot rate relative to Its equilibrium level. Under floating ex-
change rates the trade balance and capital outflow are equal. Finally,
in equations (7) and (8) the supply of output is seen to be a function
of the price level relative to an equilibrium value, which can be
thought of as either the expected price level or as the cost of labor
and other variable factors of production.
The above model leaves out many factors. Perhaps the most
notable omissions are the stocks of government and international
indebtedness.3 Such omissions might be justified by an appeal to the
short run, over which the stocks cannot change much: our focus in the
3Also omitted are some so—called "supply side" effects, such as the
possibility that a balance budget reduction in tax rates and government
expenditure would stimulate output and appreciate the currency. Such
effects have been important in the thinking of the Reagan Administration
and a few private economists, but they do not seem to be incorporated
into any of the 12 models involved in the Brookings simulation exercise.
—9—simulations will be on the effects in the second year after a policy
change (just long enough for the trade balance to get past the negative
part of the "J—curve"). In models with forward—looking expectations, of
which the MSG, Liverpool, and Taylor models among the Brookings twelve
are examples, long—run effects can be passed back through time to the
short run. But even then, the effect is generally quantitative rather
than qualitative. This paper concentrates on the more blatant of contra-
dictions: those in the sign of an effect. These are less likely to be
affected by the omission of such factors as stocks of indebtedness.4
We consider first the case when supply is infinitely elastic
* * = = co)so that the price levels P and Pare fixed in the
short run, and all variables that appear after the semi—colon are
omitted. This is the standard Mundell—Fleming model.5 Equation (6) for
the trade balance can be substituted into equations (3) and (4); these
two together with equations (1) and (2) determine four endogenous
variables——Y, Y, i, and i*__as a function of the four policy variables——
G, M, G, and M*. (Equation (5) then determines the exchange rate.)
A fiscal expansion in the Mundell—Fleming model has the following
41t is possible to get reversals of sign. For example, in some
models a fiscal expansion could be contractionary if expectations of
future debt drive up expected future short—term interest rates and
current long—terni interest rates, and therefore crowd out investment,
enough. The Liverpool model appeared to show this effect for the case
of a U.S. expansion in earlier work (Minford 1984, 100, 114, 133).
5Citations for the two—country Mundell—Fleming model are Mundell
(1964), Mussa (1979), and Swoboda and Dornbusch (1973). An early two—
country version of the portfolio—balance model, with the degree of sub-
stitutability between domestic and foreign bonds filling in for the
Mundell—Fleming model's degree of capital mobility, is Girton and
Henderson (1976).
—10—well—known effects. It increases domestic income Y and therefore the
domestic interest rate i.6 The differential between the domestic and
foreign interest rates attracts a capital inf low which, ex post,
corresponds to a trade deficit. If capital mobility is sufficiently
high (if the slope of the BB curve j/k is less than the slope of
the LM curve /X), then the balance of payments would improve atan
unchanged exhcange rate, which implies that the domestic currency appre-
ciates under floating rates. The currency appreciation may be as impor-
tant a cause of the trade deficit as the increase in income. The
counterpart foreign trade surplus increases foreign income Y. For
monetary equilibrium to hold, it also must increase the foreign interest
* ratei •Theprimary ambiguity in the above story is whether capital
mobility is high enough (or the LM curve steep enough) for the fiscal
expansion to appreciate the currency; the reverse case appears as a
prominent possibility in textbooks and in many of the large econometric
models. Some of these models have been said to exhibit an asymmetry:
fiscal expansion in the U.S. appreciates the currency but——whether
because of lower capital mobility, a flatter U1 curve, monetary
accommodation, or other factors——fiscal expansion in Europe or Japan
depreciates their currencies.
A monetary expansion has unambiguous effects in the Mundell—
Fleming model. It reduces the domestic interest rate and therefore in—
61n the limiting case of perfectcapital mobility (k =c)and an
exogenous foreign interest rate (small country), these effects vanish.
—11—creases domestic income. The differential between domestic and foreign
interest rates induces a capital outflow. The currency unambiguously
depreciates, all the more if capital mobility is high. As a result the
trade balance improves, notwithstanding the higher level of income; we
know this because of the ex post net capital inf low. The improvement in
the trade balance may constitute a larger amount of the increase In
output than the stimulus to investment and other interest—sensitive
sectors. The corresponding worsening in the foreign trade balance re-
duces foreign income. (For monetary equilibrium to hold, it must also
reduce the foreign interest rate.) Thus we get the classic Mundell—
Fleming result of inverse transmission: a coritractionary monetary
policy such as the United States adopted in 1980—82 is expansionary for
Europe, via the trade balance.
The theoretical literature features at least five ways that the
foregoing transmission results can be reversed, via effects of the
exchange rate on variables other than the tradebalance.7 The exchange
rate S can enter the saving/expenditure decision via the terms of
trade in equation (4), can enter money demand via the price level in
equation (2), can enter expenditure via real wealth in equation (4), can
enter supply via the price of imported inputs in equation (8), and can
7There is also a way that the standard Mundell—Fleming result of
negative transmission of monetary policy can be reversed via a reversal
of the trade balance. It is if net capital inflows respond to expected
future appreciation which, In turn, depends on the current level of the
spot rate relative to its equilibrium level, as indicated in equation
(6). Because discussion of this effect does not for the most part occur
in the theoretical literature on international transmission, it is post-
poned to the following section.
—12—enter supply via the nominal wage rate, also in equation (8). We
consider each briefly.
First, according to the Laursen—Metzler—Harberger effect, a
worsening in the terms of trade, i.e., an increase in SP/P, should
affect the saving/expenditure decision similarly to any other decline in
real income. In the traditional Keynesian literature, this means a
reduction in saving to protect living standards, as measured in domestic
terms:A5> o.8 The point of the original Laursen—Metzler (1950)
article was that, whena domesticexpansion depreciates the domestic
currency, the foreign country would respond to the improvement in its
terms of trade by decreasing expenditure, giving the result of negative
transmission under floating exchange rates. In the case of a monetary
expansion, the Mundell—Fleming model's introduction of capital flows
gave the negative transmission result anyway,sothe Laursen—Metzler
effect changes little. Butinthe case of a fiscal expansion (with low
capital mobility, so that the domestic currency depreciates), this
negative effect on foreign output could conceivably reverse the standard
transmission result. This case does not seem relevant to the U.S.
fiscal expansion of 1983—85, as the dollar appreciated strongly. For
the purposes of the following discussion of each of the remaining four
effects, we assume for simplicity that a fiscal expansion appreciates
the currency.
80n the other hand, the modern theory ofsaving says that only if
the currency depreciation is perceived as a temporary decline in real
income or, in the case of a permanent decline, if the rate of time
preference rises with a fall in welfare, will intertemporally—optimizing
consumers react by reducing saving. See Obstfeld (1982) and Svensson
and Razin (1983).
—1 3-.Though we have previously defined the price levels P and
to refer only to goods produced in the domestic and foreign countries,
respectively, in the case of the money demand functions they could as
easily be replaced by the consumer price indices, CPI and CPI, de-





(See,for example, Bransonand&iiter, 1983, 256—58.) A depreciation of
the foreign currency (S4) will lower the real money stock M*/CPI,
exerting a contractionary effect on foreign output. If the fall in the
exchange rate originated in a domestic fiscal expansion, this effect can
reverse the standard Mundell—Fleming result of positive transmission.
The effect on the real money stock is one of the lines of argument open
to those Europeans who believe that the U.S. fiscal expansion and strong
dollar of the early eighties had adverse effects on European growth. In
the case of a domestic monetary expansion, the domestic currency
depreciates, the foreign currency appreciates, CPI falls, the foreign
* realmoney stock rises and Y increases; transmission is positive. Thus
both the positive transmission of fiscal policy and the negative
transmission of monetary policy can be reversed.
Similar to the negative effect of the exchange rate on the real
money stock is the negative effect on the real stock of domestic gov-
ernment bonds. It can be contractionary if real wealth enters the
expenditure function. There is also a negative effect of the exchange
—14—rate on expenditure if the domestic country is in debt to foreigners in
foreign currency. Either of those effects is capable of reversing the
effects on income through the trade balance, i.e., turning the positive
transmission of fiscal policy into negative transmission and vice versa
for monetary policy. (If a country is in debt in its own currency, as
the United States is rapidly becoming, then a depreciation has a
positive effect on wealth and expenditure, reinforcing the expansionary
effects through the trade balance.)
Until now we have assumed, for the short run, infinitely elastic
* * supply(c =a=')so that the output prices .Pand Pare fixed
(in their own currencies). Relaxing this assumption does not in itself
change qualitative conclusions about movements in output, assuming the
_*
equilibriumprice levels P and P ——whether interpreted as expected price
levels or as markup functions of input costs——are constant in the short
run. Where expansionary effects on Y were previously noted, they are
replaced by increases in P and, as a result, smaller increases in Y.
To be precise, only a/i+a of an increase in aggregate demand will be
reflected in higher output. All contractionary effects are similarly
reduced. In a well—specified model, the changes in P should in the
long run be large enough to eliminate any effects on Y. But we are
concentrating on the short run, in which most models show increases in
both P and
90f course, there exist models in which prices riseso quickly that
there is no effect on output even in the short run. At the opposite
extreme, a few of the large econometric models represented in the
Brookings simulations, have the property that an expansion actually
reduces prices in the short run. This may come as a consequence of
highly procyclical productivity and the (more questionable) assumption
that prices are determined as a markup over current unit labor costs.
(cont. Onnextpage)
—15—The last two ways that the standard transmission results can be
reversed operate via the equilibrium price levels in the supply rela—
_*
tionships.Assume that P and P in the supply functions are determined
as markups over input costs; i.e., their rate of change is a linear
function of the rate of change of the prices of oil and other inputs,
the rate of change of wages, and the long—run rate of productivity
growth. An increase in input prices will shift the supply relationship
adversely, reducing output. Thus, to the extent that the price of oil
is determined in dollars, an appreciation of the dollar is contraction—
ary for other countries. This effect of the exchange rate, like the
effects on real money balances and real wealth, runs in the reverse
direction from the standard trade balance effect in the Mundell—Fleming
model: fiscal expansions that appreciate the currency can be trans-
mitted negatively and monetary expansion transmitted positively, rather
than the other way around. Thus, this route too is open to those who
wish to argue that the strong dollar has hurt Europe.
The final variable that might depend on the exchange rate is the
wage rate. (For simplicity, let P equal the wage rate.) If wages are
fixed, or determined by the unemployment rate, then the standard results
are not affected. On the other hand, if wages are fully indexed to the
domestic price level, then equations (7) and (8) become Y =Yand
*_*
Y=Y :policy can have no effect on output in either country. The
interesting case is when wages are indexed to the consumer price index,
9(Continued) Alternatively, in the case of a monetary expansion, prices
may fall if capital costs (interest rates) are reflected in mark—up
pricing: Hickman identifies such an effect for some countries
(apparently France, Italy and Canada) in the Link model.
—16—including import prices as in equations (9) and (10), because the
exchange rate can open a gap between the CPI and P. Equations (7) and
(8) then become
(11) Y/V= (P/SP*)(
** *—** (1—a) (12) Y /Y =(PsIP)
Itis clear that one country's output can go up only if the other
country's output goes down. In the case of a domestic fiscal expansion
that appreciates the currency (reduces S), there is a contractionary
effect on foreign income that is similar to those we saw for the effects
via real money, real wealth, and oil prices; all four work to reverse
the Mundell—Fleming result of positive transmission. One might expect
that a domestic monetary expansion, because it increases S in equation
(12), would have the opposite effect from a fiscal expansion, that it
would increase foreign income. But from equation (11) the monetary
expansion would then have to reduce domestic income; this perverse
result can be ruled out by the recognition from equation (3) that Y
cannot fall unless i rises and reduces A or the currency appreciates
and reduces TB, neither of which will follow from a monetary
expansion. The only possible solution is that P rises by the same
proportion as S (the increase in the money supply) and there is no
effect on either domestic or foreign income.'0
'0Sachs (1980, 737) and Argy and Salop (1977, 2—12; 1979, 228).
However if real wages are rigid in Europe and nominal wages are rigid in
the United States, U.S. monetary policy can be transmitted positively.
Argy and Salop (1977, 6—10), Oudiz and Sachs (1984, 13—14).
—17—Table 1 summarizes the various possible transmission effects of
the exchange rate. We now turn to the various results that appear in
the Brookings simulations of large econometric models.
—18—TABLE 1
THEORETICAL TRANSMISSION EFFECTS
Fiscal ExpansionFiscal Expansion Monetary
with Low with High Expansion
Capital MobilityCapital Mobility
DOMESTIC CURRENCY: Depreciates Appreciates Depreciates
EFFECTSON FOREIGNOUTPUT:





Expectations Positive Negative Positive
Effects via Domestic Demand
Negative Positive Negative Laursen—Metzler Effect
Real Money Stock Positive Negative Positive
Real Wealth Positive Negative Positive
Effects via Supply
Positive Negative Positive Imported Inputs
Wage Indexation Positive Negative Positive
—19—I. 2. The Policy Multipliers in the Simulations
Table 2 summarizes the effects of a fiscal expansion (an increase
in government spending, with the money supply and foreign policy
variables held constant) according to the 12 models in the Brookings
simulations. (The U.S. expansion is represented by Simulation B with
all signs reversed. The non—U.S. OECD expansion is Simulation G.) For
simplicity it shows the effects only in the second year.
The most well—known theoretical ambiguity, the effect on the
exchange rate, turns out to generate relatively little disagreement. In
the case of a U.S. fiscal expansion eleven models show an appreciation
of the dollar. The only exception is the Wharton model, which reports a
significant depreciation (evidently attributable to little or no capital
mobility). In the case of a non—U.S. fiscal expansion there is a little
more divergence. But seven out of eleven models still show the standard
high capital mobility result, a domestic appreciation, with only the
EPA, LINK, VAR and Wharton models showing the reverse. The asymmetry
between the exchange rate effects of U.S. fiscal expansion and European
or Japanese expansion, which here shows up only In these four models,
has been attributed to a variety of possible reasons. One of them, a
greater tendency to monetize government deficits abroad than in the
United States, should have been ruled out by the careful specification
of the Brookings experiment. Another reason suggested, lower capital
mobility (k), could explain econometric findings for individual non
U.S. countries but cannot explain the asymmetry in a well—specified two—
country Mundell—Flerning model: capital mobility into the United States
cannot be higher than capital mobility Out of the rest of the world.
—20—TABLE 2
SIMULATION EFFECT OF FISCAL POLICY IN SECOND YEAR
** * * CurrencyCA CA Value
Fiscal Expansion
U.S. Non. U.S. In U.S. (—Sini. B)
MCM +1.8%+0.4% +1.7 +2.8%—16.5 +8.9+0.4 +0.4%+0.7%
EEC2 +1.2%+0.6% +1.5 +0.6%—11.6+6.6 +0.3 +0.2%+0.3%
EPA +1.7%+0.9% +2.2 +1.9%—20.5 NA +0.5 +0.3% +0.9%
LINK +1.2%+0.5% +0.2 +0.1% —6.4 +1.9 NA —0.0%+0.1%
LIVERPOOL +0.6%+0.2% +0.4 +1.0% —7.0+3.4 +0.1 +0.6%—0.0%
MSG +0.9% +0.1% +0.9 +3.2%—21.6+22.7+1.0 +0.5%+0.3%
MINIMOD +1.0% +0.3%+1.1 +1.0% —8.5 +5.5+0.2 +0.1%+0.3%
VAR1 +0.4%—0.9%+0.1 +1.2% —0.5 —0.2—0.0 —0.0%—0.0%
OECD +1.1% +0.6%+1.7 +0.4%—14.2+11.4+0.7 +0.3%+0.4%
TAYLOR' +0.6% +0.5%+0.3 +4.0% NA NA +0.2 +0.4%+0.4%
WHARTON +1.4%+0.3%+1.1 —2.1%—15.4 +5.3+0.6 —0.1%+0.2%
DRI +2.1%+0.4%+1.6 +3.2%—22.0 +0.8+0.4 +0.3%+0.7%
Fiscal Expansion in
Non U.S. U.S. Non U.S. OECD (Sirn. G)
MCM +1.4%+0.3%+0.6 +0.3% —7.2 +7.9+0.5 +0.2%+0.5%
EEC2 +1.3%+0.8%+0.4 +0.6% —9.3 +3.0+0.0 +0.1%+0.2%
EPA +2.3%+0.7%+0.3 —0.7% NA +4.7+0.6 +0.3%+0.3%
LINK3 +1.2%+0.1% NA —0.1% —6.1 +6.3+0.0 +0.0%+0.2%
LIVERPOOL +0.3%+0.8%+0.0 +3.3%—17.2 +11.9+0.8 +3.1%—0.5%
MSG +1.1%+0.1%+1.4 +2.9% —5.3+10.5+1.3 +0.6%+0.4%
MINIMOD +1.6%+0.2%+0.9 +0.6% —2.2 +3.2+0.3 +0.2%+0.1%
VAR' +0.5%—0.3%-0.2 —2.4% +1.7 —2.6+0.2 —0.1%+0.3%
OECD +1.5%+0.7%+1.9 +0.9% —6.9 +3.3+0.3 +0.2%+0.1%
TAYLOR1 +1.6%+1.2%+0.6 +2.7% NA NA +0.4 +0.9%+0.6%
WHARTON +3.2%—0.8%+0.8 —2.4% 5.5 +4.7+0.1 —0.0%+0.0%
DRI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1U.S. CPI NA. U.S. GNP deflator reported instead.
short—terni interest rate NA; long—term reported instead.
3Appreciation of non—U.S. currency NA; depreciation of dollar reported instead.The same applies to the argument that non—U.S. countries are more open
to trade than the United States; given that the non—U.S. economy is
larger than the U.S., it must be less open in the aggregate. One
explanation that works is a steeper LM curve in the United States so
that U.S. interest rates are more easily driven up.''
For either U.S. or non—U.S. fiscal policy the simulations show
that changes are transmitted positively to the rest of the world, in all
the structural models but one. This is not surprising. Including even
the few cases where a fiscal expansion depreciates the currency, the
domestic current account is observed to worsen in all the structural
models (as it must in standard theory; it is the worsening of the trade
balance, if it is big enough, that is the cause of any downward pressure
on the currency under Mundell—Fleming). The foreign current account and
foreign income therefore increase.'2 In the majority—case where a
fiscal expansion appreciates the currency, the positive transmission to
'1Oudiz and Sachs (1984, 7, 19, 22) find the asymmetry present in
the MCM and EPA models, and attribute it to the slopes of the LM curve
and the importance of dollar assets in the world portfolio. Yoshitonii
(1984, 34—37, 62) explains that the asymmetry in the EPA model is due to
the slopes of the 124 curve and the degree of bond substitutability. A
general discussion of the various possible reasons for the asymmetry
occurred in a Brookings—World Bank conference in October 1984. (Volume
edited by Fleisig.)
the VAR results, a fiscal expansion in either country produces
a current account deficit in the other country. In the case of a U.S.
fiscal expansion, the non—U.S. current account worsens slightly in the
second year even though U.S. output rises, non—U.S. output falls, the
dollar rises against foreign currencies, and the U.S. current account
worsens! Such results suggest limitations to the usefulness of using
non—structural models to answer questions about the likely effects of
changes in policy. Cooley and Leroy (1985) consider this methodological
issue.
—22—foreign output provides a preliminary indication that the four
theoretical contractionary effects of a currency depreciation discussed
above (via money balances, real wealth, imported input prices or wages)
either are not operating, or at least are not powerful enough to reverse
standard transmission results.
The one exception among the eleven structural models is the
Liverpool model. Though lining up with the majority on the positive
effect of a fiscal expansion on the value of domestic currency, the
negative effect on the domestic current account, and positive effect on
the foreign current account, the Liverpool model nevertheless produces
the unique result of a negative effect on foreign output. The reverse
transmission holds both from the United States abroad and in the
opposite direction. Evidently one or more of the four contractionary
exchange rate effects is operating. Minford (1984, eq. 2, pp. 88—89)
specifies an adverse supply effect from depreciation, apparently
justified along the lines of the last of the four effects enumerated
above: an increase in wages, in nominal or own—product terms.'3 The
Liverpool simulations show a sharper increase in the CPI of the country
not undertaking the fiscal expansion, presumably as a result of the
depreciation of its currency, than do the other models. This could
explain the strength of the adverse supply effect in that model.
13However, Marston(1984,136) specifically describes Minfordvs
exchange rate effect on supply as coming from imported inputs, not labor
costs. (Neither wages nor imported inputs appear explicitly in the
model.) looper (1986, 7) identifies the contractionary effect of the
exchange rate in the Liverpool model as the real wealth effect.
—23—It is not surprising that the one model that shows the most
dissimilar results is nonstructural: the Sims—Litterman VAR model.
Like the Liverpool model it shows no positive transmission from U.S.
fiscal policy to non—U.S. output (the effect appears to be inverse in
the first two years, but insignificant to the third digit). More
anomalously it shows a fiscal expansion in either country reducing the
price level P in both countries (GNP deflator).'4
To sum up the results of fiscal expansion, all structural models
show positive effects on the domestic price level and negative effects
on the domestic current account. All but one show positive effects on
both domestic and foreign output. Several show a negative rather than
positive effect on the value of the currency, especially when it is the
non—U.S. OECD that is expanding. But the one case of negative trans-
mission to foreign output is not one of the few, like the Wharton model,
in which the domestic currency depreciates and thereby weakens the
transmission link through the trade balance. Rather, it is the
Liverpool model, in which the domestic currency appreciates, raising the
other country's CPI sharply with adverse effects on supply.
These conflicts regarding the exchange rate and transmissions
findings are relatively few and within the bounds of standard
theoretical results. (This does not include the VAR model which
features anomolous effects on price levels, interest rates and current
accounts.)
14The LINK model also shows a U.S. fiscal expansion reducing the
domestic price level, for the reasons mentioned in footnote 9.
—24—Table 3 displays the effects of a monetary expansion (Simulation
D for the United States and H for the rest of the OECD). The simulation
findings for the effects of monetary policy show more conflict among the
models, and the conflict is less in line with well—known theoretical
ambiguities, than for the effects of fiscal policy. The models divide
almost evenly on the transmission of a U.S. monetary expansion to the
rest of the OECD. All models show a clear depreciation of the
dollar.The MCM, EPA, LINK, Liverpool, Minimod, Taylor and DRI models
show the standard Mundell—Fleming result that the appreciation of
foreign currencies causes the foreign current accounts and incomes to
decline. But the EEC, VAR, MSG, OECD and Wrton models show positive
transmission instead. When the monetary expansion originates in the
non—U.S. OECD, positive transmission occurs not only in those five
models but also in EPA, LINK, Liverpool, MSG and Taylor.
The obvious explanation for a rise in foreign income in response
to a domestic increase in the money supply and exchange rate is that the
appreciation of the foreign currencies has one or more of the expan-
sionary effects abroad enumerated above: increasing the real money
supply and real wealth or decreasing wages and imported input costs. If
any of these expansionary effects is strong enough to dominate the
change in the trade balance, we could get the positive transmission.
The primary obstacle to attaching this interpretation to the models is
that in the Brookings simulations for the case of a non—policy
depreciation of the dollar (Simulation F) eight of the ten models show a
clear negative effect on foreign income. The only one to show a clear
expansionary effect, despite the worsening in the foreign trade balance,
—25—TABLE 3
SIMULATION EFFECT OF MONETARY POLICY IN SECOND YEAR
Y CPI Currency * * * * I CA CA I CPI Y
Value
Monetary Expansion U.S. Non. U.S.
In U.S. (Sun. D)
MCM +1.5%+0.4%—2.2 —6.0% —3.1 —3.5—0.5 —0.6%—0.7%
EEC +1.0% +0.8%—2.4 —4.0%—2.8 +1.2—0.5 —0.4%+0.2%
EPA +1.2% +1.0%—2.2 —6.4%—1.6 NA —0.6 —0.5%—0.4%
LINK +1.0% +0.4%—1.4 —2.3% —5.9 +1.5 NA —0.1%—0.1%
LIVERPOOL +0.1% +3.7%—0.3 —3.9% —13.0 +0.1—0.1 —0.0%—0.0%
MSG +0.3% +1.5%—0.8 —2.0% +2.6 —4.4—1.2 —0.7%—0.3%
MINIMOD +1.0% +0.8%—1.8 —5.7% +2.8 —4.7—0.1 —0.2%—0.2%
vAR' +3.0%+0.4%—1.9—22.9% +4.9 +5.1+0.3 +0.1%+0.4%
OECD +1.6%+0.7%—0.8 —2.6%—8.4 +3.1—0.1 —0.1%+0.3%
TAYLOR1 +0.6%+1.2%—0.4 —4.9% NA NA —0.1 —0.2%—0.2%
WHARTON +0.7%+0.0%—2.1 —1.0%—5.1 +5.3—1.3 —0.1 +0.4%
DRI +1.8%+0.4%—2.3%—14.6%—1.4 +14.5—1.1 —1.3%—0.6%
Monetary Expansion in Non U S U S
Non U.S. OECD (Sirn. H)
MCM +1.5 +0.6 —2.1 —5.4%+3.5 +0.1—0.2 —0.2%—0.0%
EEC2 +0.87.+1.0%—1.0% +2.3%—5.2+1.9 +0.0 +0.1%+0.1%
EPA +0.0% +0.0%—0.1 —0.1% NA +0.1—0.0 —0.0 +0.0%
LINK3 +0.8%—0.6% NA —2.3%—1.4 +3.5+0.0 —0.0%+0.1%
LIVERPOOL +0.4% +2.8%—0.9 —8.4%+7.1 —8.2—1.1 —3.4%+1.6%
MSG +0.2%+1.5%—0.7 —1.4% —15.9+12.0—1.2 —0.6%+0.3%
MINIMOD +0.8%+0.2%—1.8 —4.8%+3.6 —1.4—0.6 —0.5%—0.3%
VAR1 +0.7%—0.5%—3.0 —5.5%+5.2—10.0 +0.6 —0.7%+1.2%
OECD +0.8%+0.3%—1.3 —2.1%—1.6 +2.3—0.2 —0.1%+0.1%
TAYLOR +0.8%+0.7%—0.3 —3.5% NA NA —0.2 —0.5% +0.1%
WHARTON +0.2%—0.1%—0.8 +2.6 +0.5+0.0 +0.0%+0.0%
DRI NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1U.S. CPI NA. U.S. GNP deflator reported instead.
2Non—U.S. short—terni interest rate NA; long—term reported instead.
3Appreciation of non—U.S. currency NA; depreciation of dollar reported instead.is the Minimod model, which is not one of those showing positive
transmission of monetary expansion.'5 This suggests that the positive
transmission of a U.S. monetary expansion to foreign income occurs
through a channel other than the exchange rate.
In the case of the EEC, OECD and Wharton models, the channel of
the transmission of a U.S. monetary expansion is easily identified:
despite the depreciation of the dollar, the U.S. current account worsens
and the foreign current account improves. Surprisingly, the worsening
in the U.S. current account occurs not only in the three models in which
non—U.S. output rises, but also in five of the models in which non—U.S.
output falls: the MCM, EPA, LINK, Liverpool, and DRI models.'6 In the
case of the MCM model, the non—U.S. current account worsens even though
the U.S. current account worsens, while in the other four, non—U.S.
output falls even though the non—U.S. current account improves; either
breaking of the trade transmission link seems difficult to explain.
The surprise contained in the deterioration of the U.S. trade
balance in 8 out of 11 of the models is not the fact that the dollar
depreciates. Higher U.S. income accounts for higher imports, and
15me Taylor model is one that shows a smallexpansionary effect
from a non—U.S. monetary expansion on U.S. output in the first two
years, though the effect is substantially reversed thereafter. The
Taylor simulations reported in Table 3 show the U.S. currency
appreciating and the U.S. CPI falling, if only in the second year. But
the positive transmission cannot be attributed to the real product wage,
which rises slightly at first, despite the appreciation of the U.S.
currency. Rather, the positive effect of an appreciation of the
currency on real money balances and therefore output is reported to be
important in Taylor (1985, 62), and to give positive transmission of a
domestic monetary expansion to the foreign country.
'6Oudiz and Sachs (1984, 20—22) report that monetary expansion
worsens the domestic current account, for the EPA model as well as the
NCMmodel(for either the U.S., Japan, or West Germany). Yoshitomi
(1984, 347—350, 396) confirms this property of the EPA model.
—27—Simulation F, the "non—policy exogenous depreciation of the dollar,"
reveals that several of the models have a prolonged enough J curve
that the trade balance does not respond positively to the exchange rate
until the third or fourth year (Wharton, OECD, and LINK). The puzzle is
rather how the net capital inflow, which must equal the trade deficit
under floating exchange rates, can increase after a monetary expan-
sion. The monetary expansion should decrease the U.S. interest rate
(except, of course, in models where there are lags in neither expec-
tations nor price adjustment). In the simulations, the interest rate
does indeed decrease, though for most models the nominal interest rate
has already begun to start back up by the second year.'7 The Mundell—
Fleming theory under floating exchange rates says that the lower
interest rate should induce a capital outflow, implying a sufficiently
strong currency depreciation to improve the current account corres-
pondingly.18 The models in the simulations seem to be behaving more
like models of fixed (or managed) exchange rates, where an increase in
the money supply flows out of the country through a trade deficit
financed out of foreign exchange reserves, than like models with no
17Agairi the Liverpool model is the exception: the interest rate
rises in the first year and falls in the second. But even in this
model, it is lower in the second year relative to the zero baseline.
181n models of perfect capital mobility, the ex ante decrease in
demand for dollar assets, which leads to the depreciation of the
currency, is not the same thing as an ex post decrease in the net
capital account balance. But if perfect capital mobility ties the
domestic interest rate to the foreign interest rate, then it means the
trade balance must improve even more (by enough so that the higher
transactions demand absorbs all the increased money supply with no help
from lower interest rates, except via large—country effects).
—28—intervention in the foreign exchange market.
Helliwell and Padmore (1985, 1130—31) and Helliwell (1986, 15)
have identified why the large econometric models have the property that
a monetary expansion causes a net capital inf low. Capital flows respond
not only to interest rates but also to expectations of future exchange
rate changes. If the instantaneous depreciation of the currency, which
results from a monetary expansion, generates expectations of future
appreciation, then it will have a positive effect on the attractiveness
of domestic assets that runs counter to the lower interest rates. In
Helliwell's terms, speculative capital flows fulfill the stabilizing
"buffer stock" role that official intervention would play under a system
of fixed or managed exchange rates. This regressive type of expectation
has been found to be rational in the Dornbusch (1976) overshooting model
and some other versions of the asset market approach to exchange rate
determination. Its properties in the Mundell—Fleming flow approach to
the capital account are somewhat less well—known, though stated by Mussa
(1979, 191).19 It is clear that many as yet unresolved research issues
continue to fall under the heading of understanding the capital account.
One might think that showing how "speculative" capital inflows
allow a domestic trade deficit in a small—country model would be
'9yoshitomi (1984) emphasizes the importance of regressive exchange
rate expectations in potentially reversing the direction of capital
flows. Among the other models that now incorporate the regressive
exchange rate expectations of Dornbusch (1976) are the MCM model (Haas
and Syrnansky (1984)) and Minimod. The MSG model (Minford (1984, 90,97),
and Taylor (1985, 56) make the assumption that efficient market
arbitrage drives the interest differential to the rationally expected
rate of depreciation; but Taylor (1985) reports no exchange rate over-
shooting, implying that regressive expectations are not rational.
—29—tantamount to showing how they allow a foreign trade surplus, and
therefore positive transmission of the expansion, in the corresponding
two—country model. But a problem remains. If a money market equilib—
rium condition like (2) holds in the foreign country, then foreign nom-
inal income cannot rise unless foreign interest rates rise. It seems
unlikely that foreign interest rates would rise at the same time that
the domestic monetary expansion is reducing domestic interest rates.
Indeed a U.S. monetary expansion reduces short—term non—U.S. interest
rates in all ten of the reporting structural models, and a non—U.S.
monetary expansion reduces U.S. short—term interest rates in seven of
the nine reporting structural models. (In the case of the only
exceptions, LINK and Wharton, the short—term interest rate is virtually
unchanged. )20
It must be that in these models, the short—term interest rate is
not determined by a simple money market equilibrium condition, but by a
portfolio decision that considers a broader menu of assets. It would be
enough to have the demand for foreign money depend on the domestic
interest rate in addition to the foreign interest rate. If the U.S.
monetary expansion drives down U.S. interest rates sufficiently far
relative to European interest rates, or if European money demand is
sufficiently sensitive to U.S. interest rates, then the unchanged
20Gerry Hoitham points out that a simple money market equation like
(2) is consistent with a decline in the foreign interest rate and a rise
in foreign real output, provided that the exchange rate change reduces
the foreign price level by more than enough to offset the rise in out-
put. This is the case——foreign nominal GNP falls in response to a U.S.
monetary expansion——in the EEC, MSG and OECD models.
—30—European money stock can support the higher level of European income
implied by positive transmission.
To sum up the results of monetary expansion, almost as many
models show positive transmission to the rest of the OECD as show
negative transmission. Their reversal of the Mundell—Fleming result is
not attributable to non—trade effects of the exchange rate on foreign
income. Rather It appears to be due to a non—interest rate related
capital flow into the domestic country, allowing a trade balance shift
in favor of the foreign country. In terms of target variables of
interest to the domestic country, the effect of a monetary expansion on
the trade balance is the issue on which the models disagree the most.
This disagreement among the models will play a key role in the next part
of the paper.
—31—II. THEIMPLICATIONSFOR COORDINATION
BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES
It is a general principle that, when two policy makers both
affect variables that each cares about, they can do better by cooperat-
ing than they would in the Nash competitive equilibrium, in which each
acts to maximize his own welfare function taking the actions of the
other as given.21 This principle has led economists to propose
increased coordination between different domestic policy—making
agencies, and between domestic and foreign policy makers. An example of
the first type from the l98Os is the argument that the Federal Reserve
should agree to follow a looser monetary policy in return for the
Administration (and Congress) agreeing to reduce the federal budget
deficit. The point would be to reduce interest rates, the value of the
dollar and the trade deficit, without losing anything in the
output/inflation tradeoff. An example of the second type is the
argument that the United States should agree to follow a tighter budget
policy in return for Europe and Japan agreeing to move in the opposite
direction.22 The point, again, would be to reduce the trade imbalance
without causing a world recession.
The existence of conflicting models gives the literature on
international coordination a certain air of unreality. To begin with,
paper is not the first to develop an exception to this
principle. One counterexample (along very different lines) is offered
by Rogoff (1985). For good introductions to the coordination
literature, see Oudiz and Sachs (1984) or Cooper (1985).
22For example, Layard et al (1984) and Marris (1985).
—32—the issue of the gains from coordination is subtle enough that, even
among economists who agree on the broad outline of the correct model,
small differences can lead to opposite recommendations as to the
direction in which policy—settings must be moved to reap the gains from
coordination. A possible example in domestic U.S. policy—making is that
movement in the direction of a tight monetary policy and a loose fiscal
policy, far from being the outcome of a destructive lack of coordination
between the monetary and fiscal authorities, might be thought desirable
from the national point of view: the high value for the dollar reduces
the U.S. Consumer Price Index and thereby allows an improvement over the
regular output/inflation tradeoff.23 Examples in the international
context abound. OECD countries are often urged to undertake a coordi-
nated expansion; the argument is that each is reluctant to expand on its
own for fear of worsening its trade balance and/or currency value.24 On
the other hand there has been talk about the need for coordinated mone-
tary discipline (particularly in the l970s) and coordinated budgetary
discipline (particularly in the 1980s). It seems that every possible
combination has been suggested: the Nash non—cooperative equilibrium Is
variously thought to result in competitive currency appreciation,
23Sachs (1985), for example, has offered this interpretation of the
U.S. monetary/fiscal mix in the early 1980s——that it might have been
optimal given the objective function.
240ne of many examples from the 1980s is Bergsten et al (1982).
The gains from coordinated expansion by Europe, Japan and the United
States were also behind the locomotive theory that led to the 1978 Bonn
Summit.
—33—competitive currency depreciation ("beggar—thy—neighbor"), insufficient
expansion, or excessive expansion. It has even been suggested that the
gains from international coordination lie in an agreement that one
country will expand whenever others are contracting and vice versa.
If such contradictions are possible within the standard models of
mainstream macroecononiists,25 the situation is even worse once the more
widely—scattered views of policy makers are acknowledged. In the
context of 1983—1984, there was little point in trying to convince the
U.S. Treasury that, to correct the exchange rate and trade imbalance,
the United States should reverse its fiscal expansion in exchange for
European and Japanese fiscal expansion. The Treasury view was that
there had been no U.S. fiscal expansion to begin with, that fiscal
expansion causes currencies if anything to depreciate, that the strength
of the dollar was instead attributable to other factors (the safe—haven
effect), that the trade deficit was in any case not attributable to the
strong dollar (but rather to rapid U.S. growth), and——most relevantly—
that the Administration did not want Europe and Japan to undertake
fiscal expansion.
The purist will argue that if policy makers have different
"information," then they "should" share it with each other and agree o.
25Some of the conflicting possibilities arise from uncertainty as
to what are the variables that should enter the objective function and
where the economy currently is relative to the optimum, rather than
uncertainty as to the correct model or parameter values. The economist
could plausibly argue that such questions can only be answered by the
political process.
—34—a common model. The proposition about gains from coordination holds
regardless of which model is correct.26 In practical terms, then, the
purist is urging on economists a research strategy of first discovering
and agreeing on the true model, and only then convincing policy makers
that it is the true model (a task that would surely be less difficult if
uiacroeconomists agreed among themselves) and pointing out the gains from
coordination based on this true model.
Research will, and should, proceed with the aim of developing
models that more closely reflect economic reality. Most of this
research will, and probably should, proceed under the assumption that
actors within the model act on the basis of the model itself. But there
is also a need for research under the assumption that actors have
different models. These are the only circumstances under which policy-
making is likely to take place.
In this part of the paper, we consider the domestic problem in
which the two policy makers are the monetary authority and the fiscal
authority. In future work we will consider the international problem,
in which the policy makers are the U.S. authorities on the one hand and
European and Japanese authorities on the other. The findings in the
international context are expected to be quite similar to the findings
26Some authors, such as Canzoneri andGray (1983) set up their
theory in a framework general enough to encompass all of the possible
positive or negative effects. The direction in which policies must be
moved in order to reap gains from coordination can be viewed as a
function of the parameter values, the latter presumably to be filled in
later by the econometrician.
—3 5—reported here. In both problems, the 12 models that participated in the
Brookings simulations will be used to illustrate the conflicting beliefs
that policy makers could have, and their implications for coordination.
We will consider here what happens when the monetary and fiscal
authority have identical welfare functions, so as to focus on the role
of divergent models in policy conflict and coordination. In the ap-
pendix we introduce divergent welfare functions, the usual basis for
policy conflict and coordination.
—36—II. 1. Competition and Bargaining When the Policy Makers
Seek to Maximize the Same Goals Using Different Models
We begin by showing how the monetary and fiscal authorities will
prefer a cooperative equilibrium to the Nash non—cooperative one despite
an identical welfare function, if they subscribe to different models.
We will also show how, if neither of the policy makers happens to have
the correct model, the cooperative equilibrium could as easily be
inferior to the Nash equilibrium as the other way around, that is, could
result by the light of the true model in a lower value of the agreed—
upon welfare function.
When we study international coordination, each country must have
more than two goals; otherwise it can use its two instruments, domestic
monetary and fiscal policy, to attain both goals regardless what the
other country does, and no interesting issue of coordination arises.
But here we consider domestic coordination and limit the welfare func-
tion to two goals for simplicity. Let y be the log of domestic output
and x be the current account as a share of GNP, both expressed as
deviations from their desired or sustainable long—run levels. (We have
also tried the exchange rate and the CPI for the second goal). The




—37—Subscripts on the upper case letters, the policy multipliers,
will indicate the different values they can take depending on the
model: a "c" to represent the perceptions of the central bank, and an
"f" to represent the perceptions of the fiscal authority. We adopt the




To ascertain the behavior of the central bank we differentiate the loss
function with respect toin, with subscripts on the multipliers. The
first order condition is:
(15) m = —
CA + D B
-cc cc where I =c 2 2 C +D
c c
CF +DG
-cc cc and Jc
c c
To ascertain the behavior of the fiscal authority, we take the
derivative with respect to g. The first order condition is
(16) g_KfLfm,
FfAf + (kCfBf
where Kf 2 2 F +Q
—38—C F + G
and LfE
Ff +
If both policy makers knew the true model, all subscripts could be
dropped. The optimal solution in terms of the true parameters would
then follow by solving the two equations simultaneously forg and
in. There would be no issue of conflict or coordination, each agency
simply doing its agreed—upon part.
But if the policy makers believe in different models, the
subscripts must remain. The first equation has been solved for m as a
function of g and the second vice versa, so that they represent the
two authorities' reaction functions to each other's policies. The Nash
competitive equilibrium is:
—I + J K n ccf (17) m =1—JLcf
-K + L I
n ffc (18) g =l—JLcf
Assume the central bank believes in model 1.In Figure 1 we
graph its reaction function CB1, as represented by equation (16). We
draw it downward—sloping (a positive this would follow when, as in
many of the models, m and g both have positive effects on income and
both have negative effects on the current account. The central bank's
perceived indifference curves radiate Out from its perceived optimum,
point 1. They are intersected by CB1 wherever they are flat, because
















FA2Assume the fiscal authority believes in model 2. We draw its
reaction function FA2 upward—sloping (a negative Lf). This slope nilght
follow if the fiscal authority's model differs from model 1 by featuring
a positive current account multiplier for the money supply Df, as in
the EPA, MSG, Minimod, and VAR models in the case of U.S. monetary
policy (and the MCM, Liverpool, Minimod, VAR and Wharton models in the
case of non—U.S. monetary policy). The positive slope also might follow
If the fiscal authority's model differs from model I by featuring a
negative output multiplier for fiscal policy (as in the Liverpool model
in the case of non—U.S. expansion).27
The fiscal authorities' perceived indifference curves radiate
from its perceived optimum, point 2. They are intersected by FA2
wherever they are vertical, because along FA2 the fiscal authority is
optimizing with respect to g for a given m. The Nash competitive
equilibrium is where the two reaction functions intersect, point N. If
the two policy makers happen to have the same model, then point 1 =
point2 =pointN.
There is a potential issue of stability. If the policy makers
are thought of as taking turns reacting to each other according to (15)
the second target variable were the exchange rate instead of
the trade balance, then the ambiguous effect of a fiscal expansion
discussed previously could change negative slopes to positive. If it
were the price level, then the negative effect of a monetary expansion
in the LINK model or of a fiscal expansion in the VAR model could have
the same implication. However, the points to be made here, particularly
that coordination need not improve welfare, require only that the
parameter values differ, not that they differ enough to give opposite—
signed slopes.
—41—and (16), will they actually reach the Nash equilibrium point? If the
slopes are as in Figure 2, then the process is unstable. Stability
requires that the absolute value of the slope of CBI exceed the absolute
value of the slope of FA2. If the condition is satisfied, there is a
second question of whether convergence to equilibrium will be slow or
rapid. These are the first of the questions that will be analyzed below
for different possible combinations of the models in the Brookings
simulation exercise.
It is very easy to see that the Nash solution represented by (17,.
and (18) is not the optimum. (One would need I =I,K =K,'c =
andLfL, where the unsubscripted letters are defined analogously to
the subscripted ones so as to represent parameter values in the true
model, for the Nash solution to be the optimum.) Neither policy maker
will be happy with this equilibrium, each cursing the stupidity of the
other for not moving in the desired direction. As we have drawn Figure
1, the fiscal authority wishes that the central bank would increase
money growth, so as to depreciate the currency and improve the current
account. But the central bank's perception is different, that increas-
ing money growth would worsen the current account. It wishes the fiscal
authority would decrease government spending.
One might think that when two policymakers have conflicting views
as to the effects of any proposed package of policy changes, they would
simply fail to come to an agreement to coordinate. But even assuming
that neither policymaker is willing to revise his beliefs, there will ir
general be a bargain they can make
—42—g
















CB 2that will raise the perceived welfare of each. In Figure 1 the
authorities' indifference curves at N have slopes of zero and
infinity, respectively, from which it follows that they are not
tangent. They can both agree to move in the southeast direction. There
is an entire range of points, those in the shaded "lens," that
dominate N for both policy makers. Which point will they actually
agree on? Much of the literature singles out the Nash bargaining
solution, at which the product of the two agents welfare gains is
maximized relative to what perceived welfare would be at the Nash
competitive solution N12.28 The bargaining solution is represented by
a point on the contract curve like the one labelled B12 in figure 3.




=([(A+Cm+Fg)2+ w(B + Dcin +Gg)2J
2 2







Noticethat the analytics of maximizing the two agents' welfare
functions are the same as in the standard coordination problem. One
28e.g. Oudiz and Sachs (1984, 36—37). When speaking of the product
of the gains we mean them to be positive. And we rule out side—payments.
—45—could not tell from equation (19), if one did not know, that the
parameters refer to different perceptions of the same multipliers,
rather than similar perceptions of different multipliers.
The usual enforcement problems exist as well: each would prefer
to cheat on the bargain. We will ignore issues of repeated games,
credible commitment, etc., and content ourselves for the purposes of
this paper with comparisons of the static cooperative and non-
cooperative solutions.
One alternative to the Nash bargaining point as a cooperative
solution for the problem of conflicting models would be for the policy
makers to "bargain" over what is the correct model. In the event of
widely diverging Bayesian priors, it would probably take a prohibitively
great amount of new data for the two to reach a genuine convergence of
beliefs. But for the sake of compromise, in an attempt to improve on
the competitive equilibrium N12, they could base their policy actions on
a version of equations (12) and (13) in which the parameter estimates
are taken as a weighted average of their individual parameter esti-
mates. If one wished to preserve the symmetry that characterizes the
Nash bargaining solution (19), the weights could be equal, although this
seems ad hoc.
A priority for future research is to compare the implications of
a strategy of averaging the parameter estimates to the implications of
the usual Nash bargaining point. As a positive, rather than normative,
solution concept, it has the disadvantage that it could lie outside the
shaded lens, that is, it could result in one policy maker's perceived
—46—level of welfare being less than it would be at point N12. But if the
average of two parameter estimates is a better estimator of the true
parameter value than either alone, as is generally the case in
statistics, then it might be possible to show that the averaging
solution would result in a higher expected value of welfare as judged by
the true model than the Nash bargaining solution. The prescriptive
conclusion would be that ministers in OECD meetings should spend more of
their time discussing the basic assumptions underlying their views of
the world.
Our major question here is whether movement of the policy
settings in the direction that raises each policy maker's perceived
welfare, for example movement to the bargaining point B12, does in
reality affect y and x in such a way as to improve welfare. The
answer of course depends on the true model. If one or the other of the
policy makers' models (1 and 2) happens to be the true model, then
cooperation will necessarily improve welfare; otherwise that policy
maker would not have agreed to the change. But, as we argued in the
introduction, this is unlikely to be the case. More likely, reality is
represented by some third model, say point 3 in Figures 1 or 3. The
true welfare levels produced by various combinations of m and g are
represented by the indifference curves radiating from point 3. As we
have drawn it, cooperation turns out to reduce welfare, though it could
as easily have been the reverse.
To see what other outcomes are possible, we can swap models.
Figure 4 shows the possibilities. If the central bank believes model 3
—47—instead of model 1 then its reaction function is given by line CB3. If
the fiscal authority believes model 1, then the reaction line is given
by FA1. The Nash competitive point is now N31 instead of N12. The two
policy makers can raise the perceived welfare of each by agreeing to
move in the northeast direction. If reality is represented by the same
model 3 then cooperation necessarily improves welfare. But if reality
is represented by model 2 instead of model 3, then the Nash point N31
must be judged by the standard of the indifference curves radiating from
point 2. As we have drawn the graph, cooperation turns out to raise
true welfare with this combination of models.
Altogether there are twenty—seven (=3x 3 x 3) combinations:
the fiscal authority can believe any of the three models, the central
bank can believe any of the three, and reality can be represented by any
of the three. In the 9/27 combinations where the two agencies happen to
share the same model, coordination is not an issue one way or the other.
Out of the remaining 18 combinations there are 12 in which one of the
two agencies' models coincides with the true model; here coordination
necessarily improves welfare. The remaining 6 combinations could go
either way; when all three models are distinct, it seems that coordi-
nation could reduce welfare (as from point N12) as easily as improve it
(from point N31). This case becomes more important as the number of
distinct models becomes larger. If there are q models, there are
q(q—1)(q—2) combinations in which three different models are featured,
out of a total of combinations. The limit as q goes to infinity,
in which the probability of divergent models goes to 1, seems to
describe the actual state of affairs.
—48—11.2 Evidence from the Simulations
How important is the issue of conflicting models likely to be in
practice? For example, is the case where coordination reduces welfare
as judged by the true model merely a pathological counterexample? In
what follows we use the simulation results of the international
macroeconometric models that participated in the Brookings exercise to
see what might happen. If we used all 12 models there would be 1728
(=12) combinations. To keep the problem more manageable,29 we
concentrated on 6 models (giving 216 combinations): the MCM, EPA, LINK,
Liverpool, VAR and OECD models. The models were chosen to be repre-
sentative of the full range of models both with respect to geography——
one might choose to associate the NCM with U.S. beliefs, the EPA with
Japanese beliefs, and the OECD (or EEC) with European beliefs——and with
respect to philosophy——the LINK model being considered the most
Keynesian of the twelve, Liverpool the most monetarist/new classical,
and VAR the only non—structural model.
This study follows the path blazed by Oudiz and Sachs (1984).
Indeed they listed uncertainty (though not disagreement) as to the
correct model as one of the topics remaining for future research:
"A second difficulty in our treatment is the implicit assumption
that the "true" model of the world is known with certainty and
that exogenous shocks are absent during the planning period....We
have not yet investigated the implications of such uncertainty for
the logic of policy cooperation, but it is important to do so. We
is as easy to program the computer to do 1728 combinations as
fewer. But the output would be too much to digest.
—49—think Feldstein is correct when he says that such uncertainty is a
major practical impediment to greater policy coordination."
(p. 56)
Oudiz and Sachs calculated the effects of international coordination
taking the policy multipliers from the MCM and EPA models. They noted
differences between the models, but maintained the usual assumption that
the models used by both policy makers coincided with each other and with
reality. If our results on international coordination are viewed in a
three dimensional q x q x q matrix, then the Oudiz—Sachs results
should be the entries appearing on the diagonal (MCM—MCM—MCM and EPA—
EPA—EPA).
We take policy multipliers from the simulation results reported
in Tables 2 (government expenditure) and 3 (money supply). These are
the effects in the second year, chosen to represent the relatively short
run, but allowing enough time to get past the negative part of the J—
curve. For those of our experiments that envision the policy makers
taking turns in real time, one can imagine using dynamic multipliers,
that is, the entire time profile of policy effects that was produced ii
the simulations; but this complication is left for future research.
Table 4 reports the policy multipliers for the percentage effect on ths
level of GNP (the cumulated change over the two years) and the effect on
the current account as a percent of GNP; these are the terms in which
Oudiz and Sachs treat the target variables.
Computing the reaction functions (15) and (16) requires knowing
not only the perceived policy multipliers, but also the relative welfare
weight (ta)placedon the trade balance, and the perceived constant
terms (A and B).3° Though we have decided here to attribute
—50—TABLE 4
US MULTIPLIERS INTHESECOND YEAR
Percentage effect on the
level of income
y
Effect on the current account
as a percentage of GNP
x
Source: Brookings simulation results.
Monetary multipliers from simulation D, divided by 4 to go with second—year
changes in the level of N; fiscal multipliers from simulation B, with sign
reversed to go with fiscal expansion; effects on growth rate cumulated to get
effect on second—year level of income; effects on current account divided by
baseline GNP to get effect as a proportion of GNP.
—51—
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LIVPOOL0.1751 1.3042 -0.0532 —0.1791
VAR 0.9045 0.4000 0.0311 —0.0127
OECD 0.55'sC 2.oloS —0.0537 —0.3628
LINK 0.275g. 2.4144 0.OiôO —0.1647
EEC 0.4015 2.515t —0.0150 -0.2990
OR! 0.5027 4.142C —0.0059 —0.5577
IICKIB8 0.7019 1.7072 0.0187 —0.5540
MINIMOD0.4015 2.1110 0.0179 —0.2172
WHARTON0.2757 3.123k —0.0331 —0.3993the same to both policy makers, in order to concentrate solely on
conflicts in models, the value judgment remains an exceedingly difficult
and arbitrary task.It seems that the calculation as to the location of
the Nash point can be as sensitive to the choice of welfare weights and
constant terms as to the choice of policy multipliers.3' Oudiz and
Sachs made their choices based on the calculation of what the welfare
weights would have to have been for policy makers, optimizing in Nash
equilibrium, to produce the values of output, inflation and trade
balance actually observed in the l980s. There are problems with this
methodology. To use it in our context would require the computation of
different weights, not only for the two policy makers, but for every
possible combination of models. Instead we simply take weights from the
EPA case of Oudiz and Sachs and apply them uniformly to all models.32
One point regarding the constant terms can easily escape
notice. In assuming that the policy makers react directly to each
other's policy—settings g and m rather than to the target vari-
ables y and x, we have implicitly assumed that they ignore observed
deviations of y and x from what they would have expected based on
their models, or treat them as purely random disturbances.33 An
31mis is not to say that the calculation as to whether cooperation
improves on the Nash point is as sensitive to the choice of the welfare
weights as to the choice of policy multipliers.
32We do not use their weights for the MCMcasebecause the reported
weight on the U.S.currentaccount is zero.
33A complete Bayesian analysis would have agents ascribe only part of
the observed discrepancy to the error terms, and part to a revision of the
parameter values. But the premise of this paper is that it is realistic
to assume that policy—makers revise their models to a negligible extent.
—52—alternative would be to assume that they treat such observed discrep-
ancies as following a random walk, that is, as permanent revisions in
the constant terms A and B. This would be equivalent to a perpetual
updating of the intercepts of the reaction functions to insure that they
always pass through the target optimum y =x=0.This alternative
assumption is applied in the appendix, in the context of the classic
"Assignment Problem."
Table 5 reports the results for the Nash equilibrium when the two
goals are output and the current account balance, under 36 possible com-
binations of models to which the monetary and fiscal authorities can
subscribe. If one chooses, one can think of the policymakers taking
turns in real time. The first entry in each cell reports whether the
Nash equilibrium is stable, and the second reports the number of
iterations required to reach convergence (of both target variables, to
within a tolerance of 1.0 percent). Only 14/36 combinations exhibit
technical instability (most of them models in which the fiscal authority
is acting on the basis of either the VAR, or OECD models). Another
6/36, though technically stable, require more than 20 iterations to
converge. However one may choose instead to think of the policymakers
instantly jumping to the Nash equilibriumm.
The main focus of interest in Table 5 is the nature of the
coordination that the two policy makers will view it as in their
interest to undertake, under each combination of models. Two lines in
each cell indicate the change, relative to the Nash equilibrium, in
—53—P100EL SUESCR1ELO 10 MOLEL SU8CR1EEU TO BY OLN1kAL j'ç
bYFiSCAL AUTHUR11Y
P1CM
NASH POlNT STABLE? YES
STEPS 99
BARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY







































61.80 0.47 19.44 —5.29
-•95 —0.20 —3.53 0.9
7.51 C.b3 0.35 3.49 0.22
4.06 —0.19 0.02 0.24 0.09
-1.25 1.t —3.4 —2.a3 —0.15
2.55 —0.14 0.07 1.10 —0.19
0.0138 0.0001 0.0Du0 0.0013 0.0003
0.0057 0.0002 0.0000 0.001b 0.0000











C3 0.0265 a.ccco 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0301
FA 0.0808 0.CCCC 0.0011 0.0002 0.0051 0.0005
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—54—T. Table 5: Nash Competitive Solution andBargaining Solution
/ contied) __________
MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MDCLI SUBSCRIBED TO BY CENTRALBANK
BYFISCAL AUTHORiTY
P1CM EPA IIYPOOLVAR DECO LINK
VAR
NASH POiNT: STABLE? NO NC NO YES NO NO
STEPS 99 99 99 99 99 99
BARGAINING CHANGE IN POLICY
P1 2.05 2.52 0.83 0.00 2.37 0.84
G •-0.84 —1.93 0.67 0.00 —1.19 0.45
PERCEIVED CHANGE IN TARGETS
CB: Y —1.89 -4.69 1.02 0.00 -1.57 1.30
CA 0.31 0.98 —0.19 0.00 0.31 —0.11
FA: Y 1.52 1.50 1.02 0.00 1.67 0.93
CA 0.07 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.02
PERCEIVED GAIN FUR:
CB 0.0005 0.OCL5 0.0018 0.0000 0.0005 0.0002
FA 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001
DECO
tASHPOINT: STABLE? ND NC NO YES YES ND
STEPS 99 59 99 3 99 1
BARGAINiNGCHANGEINPOLICY
P1 28.65 55.29—2166.06 0.67 0.00 0.92
& —5.31 —12.C3 51(.14 —0.40 0.00 0.13
PERCEiVEDCHANGEIN TARGETS
c: Y —4.57 -6.5 293.77 0.44 0.00 0.57
CA 1.67 5.73 87.69 0.03 0.00 —0.06
FA: V 4.63 4.65 —ô.11 —0.61 0.00 0.94
CA 0.39 i.'tO —71.04 0.11 0.00 —0.10
PERCEiVEDGAIN FURS
CB 0.0034 0.C1t016.0323 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
FA 0.0029 0.0066 3.5311 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001
LiNK
NASHPOiNT: STAbLE? YES YLS YES YES YES YES
STEPS 99 1 2 2 99
BARGAININGCHANGE iN POLICY
P1 —0.46-1.3 —31.65 —0.20 —0.57 0.03
—0.13 —0.15 4.50 —0.10 —0.12 0.00
'ERCE1VED CHANGEIN TARGETS
cB: Y —0.8 -1.54 0.33 —0.2 —0.Ld 0.00
CA 0.07 0.11 1.53 —0.00 0.C7 0.00
FA: V —0.45 —0.67 2.16 —0.29 —0.44 0.03
Ci 0.04 0.05 0.46 0.02 0.04 0.00
PERCEIVEDGAiNFOR:
00 0.0000 0.0003 0.0015 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
FA 0.0000 0.0001 0.0012
—0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
99 INDICATES HCRE THAN 20 SlIPS RECL1LL FuR CONVERGENCE
—55—which they can agree to move the money supply and government expendi-
ture, respectively, in order to maximize the product of the two
perceived gains in welfare. The next two lines indicate the effects
that the two agents perceive such a package of policy changes will have
on the target variables; they can be obtained by taking the product of
the change in policy settings and the multipliers reported in Table 4.
The last two lines in each cell indicate how much the central bank and
fiscal authority, respectively, thinks that the country has to gain in
terms of the welfare function (equation (14)) by the movement of the
policy—settings in the indicated direction. If the policy makers happen
to believe the same model (the diagonal cells), then there is no scope
for coordination. This is a consequence of our ruling out conflicting
welfare functions; each thinks that the country is at the optimum.
Otherwise, there will be scope for coordination. Consider the
example where the central bank subscribes to the MCM model and the
fiscal authority to the OECD model. Each perceives that they can
accomplish relatively large welfare gains by an alteration of the mix in
favor of more expansionary monetary policy and more restrictive govern-
ment spending. This is the kind of coordination that has been suggested
frequently for the United States in the 1980s; the Nash competitive
solution results in too high a level of interest rates, value of the
dollar, and size of the trade deficit. It shows up in 12 cases in Table
5. But all other combinations appear as well. Coordination could call
for contractionary monetary policy and expansionary fiscal policy (5
cases, most of them cases where the monetary authority subscribes to the
Liverpool or LINK model), or expansion on both fronts (6 cases, again
56cases where the monetary authority subscribes to the Liverpool, or LINK
models), or contraction on both fronts (7 cases, most of them cases
where the fiscal authority subscribes to the Liverpool or LINK models).
To find out whether a given plan for policy coordination raises
welfare in truth, rather than only in the perceptions of the policy
makers, we would have to know the true model. This we cannot do. But
we can get an idea of the range of possibilities by judging it by the
standard of each of the other models in the Brookings simulations. The
36 cells in Table 6 correspond to the same 6 x 6 combinations of sub-
scribed—to models as in Table 5. Each gives the true welfare gains,
under 6 possible models of reality. Consider again the example where
the central bank subscribes to the MCM and the fiscal authority to the
OECD model.If either the MCM or OECD models coincides with the true
model, then there will necessarily be a true welfare gain, equal to
.0034 or .0029, respectively, just as the central bank or fiscal
authority, respectively, thought there would be. (The welfare units are
expressed in terms of the variance of output.) It turns out that if the
true model happens to be the EPA or VAR model, then there will also be a
welfare gain. But if the true model is the Liverpool or LINK model,
then there will be a welfare loss. The coordination plan moves policy
settings in the wrong direction, and everyone would have been better off
staying with the Nash competitive equilibrium. This conclusion is
probably less alarming for those who are not fans of either of these two
models, than for those who are. But such readers should recognize the
possibility that the fiscal authority will subscribe to, say, the
Liverpool model and the central bank to the LINK model; then the coordi
57Table 6a: TRUE GAINS FROM COORDINATiON
MODEL SUbSCRIbED ID MODEL SUhSCR1LED TO BY CENTRAL bANK
bY FISCAL AUThORITY
MCM EF't. L1VPUDL VAR DECO LINK
MCM
MODEL REPRESENTiNG REALITY:
MCM 0.0000 0.0057 0.0002 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000
£PA 0.0000 0.0138 0.0029 0.0007 0.0100 0.0027
LIVPL)UL 0.0000—0.063 0.0001 —0.0001 —0.0092 0.0348
VAR 0.0000—0.1770 0.025b 0.0000 0.0010 0.0632




11CM 0.02o5 0.OCOO—0.0017 0.00i6—0.0161 0.0312
EPA 0.0808 0.OCCO 0.0011 0.0002 0.0051 0.0005
LIVPGLL —0.0596 0.0000 0.0000—0.0003—0.0178—0.0007
VAR 0.4121 0.0000 0.0201 0.0000—0.0911 0.0049
DECO 0.0379 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0026 0.0317



























































MCM 0.0005 —0.0029 0.3309
EPA 0.0033 0.0015—0.0312
L1VPOOL —0.0005 —0.0009—0.0005
VAR 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
DECO 0.0012 0.0005—0.0008
LINK 0.0000 —3.0017 0.0002
UECD
MODEL REPRESENTING RIALITY:
11CM 0.0034 —0.01978￿.2990 —0.3013 0.0000
EPA 0.0164 0.OlbO62.3113 0.0002 0.0000 —0.0001
LIVPOLL —0.0128—0.05416.0323—0.0003 0.0000—0.3306
VAR 0.0203—0.0773 33.7b96 0.0000 0.0000 0.3009
UECL) 0.0029 0.OCL6 3.311 0.0001 0.0000 0.3001




EPA 0.0013 0.0103—0.0420 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003
LIVPOOL 0.0006 0.CC1O 0.0015 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000
VAR 0.0025 —0 .0118—0.4466 0.0000—0.000b 0.3000
OLCO 0001b 0.0100—0.0562 0.0003 0.0000 0.3000
LINK C.0000 0.0001 0.0012 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
58Table 6b: BLRGt1p'1?.G OEVIAIILJN OF V FROM NASH
MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MODEL SUbCI1EEO TO BY CENTRAL BANPc.
bY FISCAL AUTHORITY
MCM LEA LIVPLJOLVAR 0ECDLJNj
P1CM
MODEL REPRESENTiNG REALiTy:
11CM 0.0000 l.2544 1.6821 —0.4511 —2.8270—0.1457
EPA 0.0000 7.5109 1.5732 —0.37660.0014—0.8877
LIVPOOL 0.0000-0.8538 0.6294 —0.17681e1538—0.0232
VAR 0.000052.3206 1.64460.3491 16.192 —4.5038
UECD 0.000016.99CC 1.7791 —0.21123.4865—1.6459
LINK 0.0000—4.6688 1.0816 —0.3504 —3.1622 0.2160
LPA
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
11CM —1.5940 0.CGCO 1.7888 —1.2099 —7.5542 1.6033
EPA 18.7815 0.COCO 1.8918 —1.0763 —2.b898 1.7485
LIVPOOL —1.4836 0.0000 0.6737 -0.4644 —3.0650 0.6015
VAR 122.0132 0.0600 1.14630.4465 25.8123 1.3455
DECO 40.5840 O.CCCO 1.6857 —0.72223.3664 1.6195
LINK —9.7994 0.COCO 1.1930 —0.8937 —7.2147 1.0467
Li VP OOL
MODEL REPRESENTiNG REALITY:
11CM —2.2212 28.2354 0.C000 —1.9355 —1.0101—.2393
EPA —2.4010—5.3455 0.0000 —1.9302 —1.0359 —14.594
LIVPOOL —0.834312.1529 0.0000 —0.7352 —0.3818—0.3289
VAR —1.7354 —193.5415 0.0000 —0.5217 —0.4529 —73.0970
OECO —2.2000 —45.7147 0.0000 —1.5804 —0.8854 —b.6235
LINK -1.459233.8558 0.0000 -1.3440 —0.oblS 3.5951
AR
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
11CM —1.8946—5.4673 2.69250.0000 —2.9562 1.92c4
EPA —1.5490—4.8918 2.73020.0000 —2.5339 1.9853
LIVPLJUL —0.7331—2.0721 1.01900.0000 —1.1385 0.7269
VAR 1.5193 1.5646 1.02080.0000 1.6e7 0.9337
DECO —0.8505 —3.3958 2.29630.0000 —1.5877 1.7111
LINK —1.4577—3.9592 1.84570.0000 —2.2244 1.3047
(iiCD
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
MCM 4.565814.9C26 737.6275 —1.05400.UuOO 0.5811
EPA —0.3850—6.o50 ',09.5804 —0.986 0.0000 0.9547
LIVP(JUL —1.9113—6.C054 93.7o9d —0.40500.0000 0.3295
VAR 23.786245.1579 —1752.7476 0.44320.0000 0.5826
DECO 4.83.4.83 —66.1134 —0.61060.0000 0.9391
LINK —4.9418—13.6265 649.9707 —0.7t240.0000 0.5650
LINK
MODEL REPRESENTING REALiTY:
11CM —0.6789—1.316 0.3530 —0.4273 0.ô]1 0.0300
EPA —0.7234—1.577 —4.1275 —0.44.b 0.73L5 0.0000
LIVPOUL —0.2554 —0.5056 0.32720.1613 —0.2520 0.0003
VAR —0.4676 —1.4559 —26.8295 —0.210 —O.5c31 0.0003
DECO —0.6509 —1 .48's1 —8.9222 —0.3d36 —0.6754 0.0000
LiNK —5.4505—0.56b4 2.1566-0.2900.4386 0.0003
—59—Table Sc: BAkGA1MIG LEVIATIUN OF CA FROM NASH
P!UUEL SUBSCRibED TO MODEL SUbSCRIBED TO bY CENTRAL bANK
bY FISCAL AUTHORITY
P1CM EPA L1VPLJUL VAR OECL) LINK
PICH
MODELREPRESENTING REALITY:
P1CM 0.0000 2.5522 —0.14070.07461.1018 —0.17J,
EPA 0.0000 4.0551 —0.1501 0.09941.6454 —0.3082
LIVPOOL 0.0000 —3.5360 —0.1873 —0.0037 —0.9849 0.3156
VAR 0.0000 2.0329 0.04980.01720.6483 —0.1729
OECD 0.0000 —0.0672 —0.1835 0.04550.2363 0.0325
LINK 0.0000—0.8711 —0.10650.0148 —0.1571 0.0bbtI
EPA
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
P1CM 5.7811 0.0000 —0.11720.17572.1491 -0.1443
EPA 9.2419 0.0000 —u.2040 0.22793.1186—0.1594
L1VPOOL —5.3049 0.CCOO —0.15780.0229 —1.4377—0.1533
VAR 4.7299 0.0000 0.02960.0272 1.0599 0.0389
DECO —0.2971 0.0000 —0.19280.12580.6976—0.1741
IiNK —2.0926 0 .OCCO —0.1026 0.04710.1110 —0.0976
LIVPLOL
MODEL REPRESENTiNG REALITY:
MOM 0.2057 —12.4690 0.00000.22490.1089—3.0535
EPA 0.2303 —18.8C41 0.00000.27410.1295—5.0218
L1VPIJ[JL 0.217412.0364 0.00000.12160.0758 5.1167
VAR —0.0489—7.7137 0.0000 —0.0043 —0.0092—2.8074
OECO 0.2407—2.2375 0.00000.20520.1082 0.5145
LiNK 0.1329 2.1379 0.00000.09840.0545 1.4005
VAR
M0ELREPRESENTiNG EAL1TY:
P1CM 0.3126 0.767 —0.2989 0.00000.4555—0.2043
EPA 0.4173 0.9825 —0.3589 0.00000.5993—0.2415
LIVPD[iL —0.0205 0.1359 —0.18920.00000.0164—0.1492
VAR 0.0743 0.1025 0.0174 0.00000.0687 0.0203
DECO 0.1938 0.5640 —0.2875 0.00000.3051—0.2063





LIVP[JLL —1.4308—2.'s'33 87.65640.01620.0000 —0.0996
VAR 0.9570 1.€e9€ —73.8117 0.02580.0000 0.0269




P1CM 0.0657 0.iCsO —1.27150.34490.0605 0.0000
EPA 0.0750 0.1120 —4.03260.05283.0668 0.0000
L1VPUDL 0.0621 0.1604 1.82600.03390.0o84 0.0000
VAR —0.0125—0.0Y3 —1.0401 —0.0049 —0.0163 0.0000
OECD 0.0733 0.1490 0.0651 0.04590.0729 0.0003
LiNK 0.0395 0.0L65 0.46000.04350.0409 0.0003
—60—Table 6d: True Deviation of CA from Target under Bargaining Solution
MODEL SUBSCRIBED TO MLUELSUBSLkIBED TO BY CENTRAL BANK
BY FISCAL AUTHORITY
MCM EPA LIVPOOL VAR DECO LINK
tICM
MODELREPRESENTING REALITY:
MOM 0.0000 0.5327 6.1663—2.7244 —2.0403—0.0169
EPA 0.17b7—1.3750 —10.2638 —4.6944 —3.7129—0.2062
LIVPOUL —11.1815—9.3112 1.1405 —6.430—6.8329—11.1550
VAR 0.0280—0.6968 —5.5179 —2.5541 —2.2416 0.0132
DECO —'s.2032—3.6998 —..30?1 —3.6549 —3.4040—4.201
LINK —5.0202—4.4024 —2.30993.5969 —3.7065—5.0131
EPA
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
P1CM —0.6337 0.4357 —7.1667 —1.90290.3305—3.2830
EPA —1.353e—0.0000 1i..SbBB —3.5610—0.3682—5.6880
LJVPULL —9.42e1—9.u13E —0.llObb.15b2 —7.9220—5.1073
VAR —0.8475—0.75s1 —5.9523 —2.4985 —1.2828—3.2329
DECO —3.7577—2.90s3 —3.7000—2.9840 —2.3911—3.3696
LINK —4.4499—4.0b89 —2.3145 —3.4055 —3.6300—3.2829
LIVPOOL
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
P1CM —5.5391—1.5587 —7.8615 —1.5562 —0.8606—6.4199
EPA —9.4400—3.1096 12.720 —3.2437 —2.1559 —10.937d
LIVPOOL -1.7995—6.7271 —0.0000 —5.9573 —6.6167 0.6212
VAR —5.1283—2.1274 —6.3567 —2.5112 —2.0008—6.3171
DECO —3.2860—3.0446 —3.8541 —2.6607 —2.6267—.6096
LINK —2.45103.5LL5 —2.2197 —3.2490 —3.4438—1.6532
VAR
MODELREPRESENTiNG REALITY:
P1CM —2.7267—1.8755 1.1962 37.7395 —1.9547—2.6928
—4.5970—3.6290 0.2242 46.1235 —3.7246—4.6638
—S.43s4 6.1c2o —5.04747.5930 —6.1835—s.3760
—2.5536—2.4995 —2.3183 —0.0000 —2.4986—2.5721
—3.6576—2.9591 —0.4184 29.6085 —3.0301-3.6058






—2.0221 0.4600 5.7544 —1.94385.5925—2.7203
—3.6916—0.1150 7.2431 —3.7i46.9994 4.7699
—5.8184—7 .9.9b —10.1319 —6.1720 10.0475—6.0120
VAR —2.2439 —l.41 0.7935 —.5012 0.7216—2.731
DECO —i.3650—2.2974 0.0708 —3.0174 —0.0000 3.4458





—1.7502 —2.b.51 —6.4038 —2.6954 —2.9093 8.b4kb
—3.0689 4.5's(.4 —10.6757—4.5571 —5.04o8 —1'.8975
LIVPQDL —6.2563—5.6470 C.ç089 —6.3761 —5.b625 5.9143
VAR —1.5801—2.638 —6.2238 —2.5725 —2.83*.9 —9.025.3
DECO —3.9165—3.4330 —2.7030—3.6075 —3.4955 —1.48u





DECOTable 6e: True Deviation of Incce from Target under Bargaining Solution
MODEL SUbSCRIBED TO MOCEL SUBSCRIbED TO BY CENTRAL SANK
bY FISCAL AUTHORiTY









14.7033 6.6945 —12.40720.8631 —0.408514.6346
—2.1882—3.4907 —2.4077 —2.7593 —3.8246—2.187's
ce.3206'.3.5759 —75.83700.94158.461767.9369
25.8781 14.6C58 —25.81330.82881.482625.7432
LINK —4.5264—5.5.56 3.3654 —1.71344.1375—4.5028
[PA
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
MOM —3.3833 —11.4170 0.8132 —9.1376 —15.899—4.8238
EPA 7.5992 0.CCCO —10.2288 —5.1805 —6.5697—4.0881
LIVPOOL —3.3101 —6.'i039 —0.7688 —5.1883 —7.9826—3.4143
VAR 44.9564 45.8104 —86.2026 1.026431.046—17.0539
DECO 15.4393 9.7950 —26.3911 —3.74851.6661—6.8141









—8.8557 2.6403 —12.1701 —12.9646—9.1182
EPA —3.St4O —10.1668 —8.2261 —6.6136 —21.5936
L1VPOOL —s.1si C.0000 —8.3374—6.7338 4.4718
VAR 9.1339 —96.27460.0558 13.0883 —97.7467
OECC —22.8117—0.7720 —26.5151 —6.2743 —2.3909 —37.5222






.8898 —5.4153 —28.4014—299.4691 —4.7521 0.3469
LIVPOOL —2.7500—5.2768 —14.4595—123.0813 —5.0231—2.9249
VAR 0.9605 0.9513 0.52410.00001.1166 0.3824
DECO 0.8532—3.94i7 —1.516k—227.7715 —3.4036 0.3157
LINK —1.6971—6.4119 —23.5560—226.5305 —5.9544—1.9908
LECO
MODEL REPRESENTING REALITY:
P1CM —5.5965 —16.7647 —40.9647 —8.8200—'.0.2311—'..5711
EPA —0.5927—7.3L26 —.4051 —4.8759 —21.9907-1.6199
LIVPOOL —3.8911—6.3164 —17.6838 —5.0672 —17.5919—3.4112
VAR 6.364531.717 79.42631.0254 77.7240—q.033
DECO 1.3216 1.2451 0.0515 —3.51990.0000—2.1775
LINK -4.2562 —13 .8735 34.4997 —6.0316 —33.8562 2.8453
LINK
HUDEL REPRESENTiNG kIALI1Y:
P1CM —1.1882 —4.6061 —8.3245 —3.1955 —4.0070 —17.3547
EPA t.8116—2.1112 —20.40960.3o13i.5682 —41.3703
LIVI-'OOL —2.3407—3.4074 —4.1873 —2.9185 —3.1779—7.0961
VAR 28.4713—8.4L52 —95.16640.3736 —8.5562 —189.5493
OECD 10.1035—3.0211 —i6.06560.3247 —2.6429 —66.0402
LINK —2.4013—2.5604 1.1517 —1.9752 —2.0b22 0.0003nation plan (monetary contraction and fiscal expansion) will again
worsen welfare as judged by the other four models.
Of course the proper strategy, if the true model could be
discovered, would be simply for both policy makers to optimize subject
to it. The point here is that one cannot, under conditions where policy
makers subscribe to different models, make the blanket pronouncement
that coordination must improve welfare.
Of the 216 (=6)possible combinations in Table 6, 180 (=216—
6)involve disagreement between the policymakers, and therefore
bargaining. Of the 180, welfare is improved by bargaining in 98 cases
and worsened in 64 cases. (In 18 cases the effect is not perceptible:
zero to four decimal places.) However in 60 (=2x 6 x 5) of these
cases, one agency or the other has the true model, so that a non—
negative welfare change is guaranteed. Of the 120 (=6x 5 x 4) cases
where the agencies' models differ not only from each other but also from
the true model, welfare is perceptibly improved in 52 and worsened in 64.
When all 11 available models are used (the Taylor model reports
no results for the current account) there are 1331 (=ii)possible
combinations. Of the 1210 (=1331—112)that involve disagreement and
bargaining, welfare is perceptibly improved in 667 cases and worsened in
477 cases. Of the 990 (=11x 10 x 9) cases where three distinct models
are involved, welfare is perceptibly improved in 490 cases and worsened
in 471 cases. As a sensitivity analysis with respect to targets, we
tried redoing the analysis with a target level of GNP assumed to be 25
percent above the baseline. When all 11 models are used, 537 of the
cases involving 3 distinct models show perceptible welfare gains from
—63—bargaining and 402 show losses. We also tried a target level of GYP
assumed to be 5 percent below the baseline; 557 of the cases involving 3
distinct models show welfare gains and 408 show losses. It may not be a
coincidence that coordination does, after all, produce welfare gains in
a (slight) majority of cases. A convex combination of two sets of
parameter estimates——even such a strange nonlinear "convex combination"
as comes out of the coordination mathematics——may be closer to the true
answer, and on average closer to any third set of parameter estimates,
than either individually. But to the extent there are possible gains
from coordination of this type, it might be more advantageous for the
agencies to realize them by bargaining over the correct model rather
than over the policies.
—64—II. 3. Extensions
Quite a number of extensions have been left for future research,
even after the same issues that have been investigated here for domestic
policy making are repeated for international policy making. We could
try different objective functions. For the exercises where the policy
makers are viewed as taking turns in real time, we could use the more
complete time profile of multiplier effects reported in the Brookings
simulation. A high priority is to compare the results of two possible
kinds of cooperation among policy makers: the Nash bargaining solution
versus maximization of joint welfare based on a model with parameter
values determined by averaging the estimates of the two.
More ambitious modeling is possible. We could study a
Stackelberg equilibrium in which the U.S. policy makers are able to
choose their preferred point on the other countries' reaction curve. It
would be interesting to compare a naive Stackelberg equilibrium in which
the U.S. authority assumes that the others' actions are based on the
same model as its own, versus, the "rational expectations" Stackelberg
equilibrium in which the U.S. authorities realize that the foreign
governments will react on the basis of their own model, even though that
model is different from the model that the U.S. authorities themselves
believe to be correct. Other possibilities include having the policy
makers update their parameter estimates each period to reflect new
information in a Bayesian manner, evaluating institutional arrangements
like fixed exchange rates that might substitute for coordination, and
applying game theory concepts of repeated games and precomniitment.
—65—APPENDIX: WHEN ThE POLICY MAKERS
ARE ASSIGNED DIFFERENT GOALS
The preceding analysis was unusual in that issues of conflict and
coordination among policy makers were assumed to arise solely out of
divergent models. In this section we introduce the more usual diver-
gences in goals as well. As a concrete example, it is sometimes
observed that the fiscal authority cares more about output and
employment, particularly in an election year, and the central bank more
about other variables.34
We adopt the extreme assumption that the fiscal authority cares
only about output and the central bank cares only about the other
variable, or vice versa. This assumption is not necessary, but keeps
things simple. It has the added advantage that when we compare the two
possibilities——a Nash equilibrium with the fiscal authority monitoring
output and the central bank monitoring the other variable, versus the
reverse combination——we are doing the classic Assignment Problem. Under
this interpretation the writer of a national constitution, resigned to
the necessity of decentralization of policy—making, must decide which
agency to make responsible for internal balance and which for external
balance. As Mundell (1962) showed, the wrong assignment of responsi-
bility could result in an unstable system. Mundell's solution was the
principle of "effective market classification:" assign each agency
34mis section could be viewed as awarm—up for studying
international coordination, where the divergence in goals is clear.
—66—responsibility for that goal for which its policy tool is comparatively
more effective. We will see how the possibility of conflicting models
changes the nature of the Assignment Problem, as we have seen that it
changes the nature of gains from coordination.
We return to the targets—and—instruments equations (12) and (13),
each perceived differently by the two authorities. But we add new
objective functions. Under Assignment Rule I, the central bank seeks to
minimize variation in output y and the fiscal authority to minimize




If we continue to assume that the constant terms are not revised in the
light of new information, the first order condition implies
A F
C C (21)
The fiscal authority seeks to minimize
(22) x2 =(Bf+
Dfm+Gfg)2




35Equations (21) and (23) are the same as equations (15) and (16),
respectively, with w =0and w =, respectively.
—67—Equations (21) and (23), the two reaction functions under Assignment
Rule I, are graphed in Figure 5. The central bank's reaction function
CB1, Equation (21), slopes downward as long increases in m and g are
both thought to increase income. (The only exception among the 12
models is the Liverpool simulation, in which g can have a negative
multiplier.) But the fiscal authority's reaction function FA1,
Equation (23), slopes upward if an increase in g is thought to have
the opposite effect from m, that is to improve the current account (as
in the EPA, MSG, MiniMod, and VAR for a U.S. fiscal expansion), and so
we have drawn it that way. If the two agencies are thought of as takin
turns in real time, then the system is stable if and only if the
absolute value of the slope of CB1 is greater than the absolute value
of the slope of FA1:
(24)
Cc/Fc > Df/G
Under Assignment Rule II, the central bank seeks to minimize
variation x2 in the trade balance and the fiscal authority variation















equation (23)If the two models coincide, as in the conventional Assignment Problem,
then one of the two Rules must be stable and the other unstable.36 But
with conflicting models, it is possible that both rules are stable, or
that neither are.
In general with conflicting models, the equilibrium point where
the two reaction functions intersect will be different depending on the
rule and on the perceived models. One has only to solve equations like
(21) and (23) simultaneously and compare the solution with the simul-
taneous solution of equations like (25) and (26) to see the differ-
ence. One can evaluate the two solution points for inandg by the
standard of the true model to see the values of y2 and x2 that they
will in reality produce. The true value of the welfare function at the
equilibrium point would probably be a more important criterion for
evaluating the two possible assignment rules than is the criterion of
stability. In the problem considered in this paper, where each policy—
maker has only one goal, each will succeed in attaining his optimum (y
=0and x =0)regardless what the other does, so all equilibrium
points coincide. Stability is the only relevant criterion. But the
issue of different equilibrium points and different resulting welfare
levels arises if the domestic policy—makers have multiple goals, or in
the context of international policy—making.
The above equations have the property that the policy makers do
not revise their views as to the values of the policy multipliers even
361f the two slopes happen to be equal in absolute value, then
convergence will not be reached under either rule.
—70—though they observe levels of y and x that are inconsistent with
what their models would have predicted from the current settings of m
and g. In the previous section we made the assumption that such
discrepancies were viewed by the policy makers as transitory error
terms. In this section, since we are studying a problem in which each
agency has a single target variable, we make the alternative assumption
that each agency reacts directly to the observed value of the variable,
making the policy change that would be best if its multiplier estimates
were correct. Since its policy reaction line always runs through the
optimum point (y =0,x =0),and the slopes are functions of the
multipliers, we are in effect assuming that the discrepancies are viewed
as shifting the perceived constant terms in equations (12) and (13).
Under Assignment Rule I, the central bank and fiscal authority,




By substituting these policy rules in equations (12) and (13), the true







—71—In specifying the reaction equation for we have assumed that the
central bank has taken its turn first. The roots of the system of the














(32) x = fc f c f c
2
The system is stable if both roots are within the unit circle. In the
special case where the two agencies have the correct models,
(C =C,Gf =G, =0,Cf =0)
the condition for stability reduces to
DF
Gc<l
which is the standard relative—slopes solution to the Assignment
Problem.
—72—Under Assignment Rule II, the policy authorities' swap target Is




By substituting into equations (12) and (13) we obtain a system, with
roots that can be solved for in the same way.
We took the approach of using the multiplier estimates from Table
4, in simulations of the two policy makers alternating turns, to find
out the number of steps needed for convergence in addition to the answer
as to whether the system converges at all. Table 7 reports the results
for all 216 possible combinations of the 6 models. Each of the 6 panels
represents one true model. Within each panel are 36 cells representing
the possible combinations of models subscribed to by the two policy
makers. Within each cell is reported, first, convergence under Rule 1
(a "1.' if the system is stable, followed by the number of steps required
for convergence), and then convergence under Rule II (a 2" for
stability, followed by the steps to convergence).
Consider the case when the true model is the MCM. If the central
bank subscribes to the MCM, EPA or VAR, the system is stable only under
Rule 1, and otherwise it is stable only under Rule II, with the added
result that it is often unstable under either rule if the central bank
subscribes to the OECD or LINK models, and is always unstable if the
fiscal authority subscribes to the VAR. Unlike in the standard problem,
—73—True Model: 1
TABLE 7
STABILITYUNDERASSIGNMENTRULES I MID 11
1 2 3' 5ô
11ii 99$ ii 99$991
2$2$ 99$ 21 991 99$
1$ I I I I I I
I 99$99121 991 2$ 21
I 99$99$ 21991 212$
I 1$ii 99$ii99$ 99$
I 991 991 212121 21
991 991 21 2121 21
I 11II 9'flii 991991
I2$2$ 99$ 2$ 591 99$
3$ $ I I I I I
I 991 991 99$99$ 99$ 991
$99$99$ 991 991 991 591
I99$99$ 99$ 99$ 99$99$
$99$99$ 991 991 991 99$
I I I I I I
1 991 991 99$99$ 991 991
I 991 991 991.991 991 99$
I 1$1$ 99$1$ 99$ 99$
I2$2$ 99$ 21 991991
SI I I I 1 I
99$ 99$ 2$99$ 95$ 99$
$99$99$ 31991 991 991
1$ U 99$ii9.91 991
Iit H 99$2L1 991991
I I I I
I 991 991 2$991 95$ 99$
$99$ 99$ 31 991 591 991
1 2 3', s
$ ii1$ 99$U 591 991
I2$ 2$ 99l21991 991
ii I I I I I I
I 99$99121 99$ 2121
I 99$59$ 2$ 99$2$ . 2)
I 1$it99$U 59$ 99$
I2$21 9512199$ 99$
2$ I I I I 1 I
I 991 991 21 21212)
I99$9912121 2$2$
$1111 991 1$99$ 99)
I21 2199$ 2$ 9$ 59$
3$ I I I I I I
I 99$ 991 991 991 53I 991
I 99$99$ 991991 991 991
I 99$ 99$99$ 99$ 99$ 991
I 991 991 991 991 991 99$





51 I I I I I $
I 99$991 21 9I 99$ 99!
1991 991 31 9I 91 991
I itit 95$11991 991
I7$SI99$21.1 991 99$
I 1 1 1 I
I991991 21 99$ 591 991
$991 99$•31 99$ 99$ 99$
True Model: 2
Key to Models:
1. MCM2. EPA3. LIVERPOOLL.VAR5.OECD6. LIIUK
KeytoCells:
flU1U ifconverges under Rule I. "99" otherwise.
[J
Numberof steps to convergence. "99" if nior than 90.
"2" if converges under Rule II."99" otherwise.
Numberof steps to convergence. "99" if more than 90.
—74-TABLE 7 (continued)
True Model:3
1 2 3 4 6
Iiiii 99!ii99!991
I2!2! 99! 2! 99! 991
1! I I I I I
I 991 99!21991 2!2!
I99!9911 99! 2! 2!
I1!ii 99!1! 99! 991
I2!2! 99! 21991 99!
2! I I I I I I
I 991 991 212!2!2!
I99!99! 6! 212! 2!
I1!1!99!II 99! 99!
121ii 9912! 99!991
3! I I I I I
I 99!99121 99! 99!99!
I99!59! 2199! 991 99!
I99!991991 991 59!99!
I99!99! 99199!99!99!
4! I I I I I I
I 991 99!?I99!2! 991
I991 99!4! 99! tiI99!
I11ii 99!U991 99!
I2!2! 99!2!991991
5! I I I I I
I 99!99! 2! 99199!99!
I991 99!3! 99! 99199!
I iiII 99!1195! 991
17!5! 99121 991 99!
I I I I I





I2! 2! 99!21991 99! ii I I I I I I
I 99$991 2!2! 12!
I99!99!2!bI21 2!
III1!99!II99!99!
212! 991 21 59!99$




I2!2)99! 2! 99! 99!
3$ I $ I I I
I 99! 95!21 2! 99199!
I99!99! 2$'ii 99! 99)
I99$99199$99$ 'iS) 99L
1 991 99!99! 991 59199!




I2$2) 99! 2! 99$ 9l
5! I I I I I I




I I I I I I
1 99!99! 2!21 I 99$
I99!95! 315!'4! 991
Key to liodels:
1. MCM2. EPA3. LIVERPOOL'.VAR5. OECD6. LIflK
Key to Cells:
[1"1",if converges under Rule 1. "99" otherwise.
U
Numberof steps to convergence. "99" if more than 90.
"2"if converges uncer Rule II. "99" otherwise.
Number of steps to convergence. "99" if more than 90.
—75—TABLE 7 (continued)
True ?4del:5
1 2 3 4 5 6
I1!ii991ii 99! 991
I2!2199!21991 991




I2!21 991 21 951 991
2! I I I I I I
I 99! 991 21212! 21
I 991 991 212121 21
IIiii99111 991 99!
I2121 9912!95!991
31 I I I I
1 99!59! 212!212$
I991 99!214!615$
I991 991 99!99199! 991
I 99!99! 991991 99!99!
I I I I I
I 99! 99! 2!212!2!
I 99! 991 4!18!64!60!
ILI11991 1!99! 99!
I21 21 9912!95! 99!
51 I I I I I
I 991 99!2!212! 2!
I99!991 1 5!212!
I 1111 991Il 99!99!
I7!'I99!10! 59! 99!
61 I I I I I
I 99!99! 2!2!2! 2!
I99!99! 3!5!2! 21
• True Model: 6
1 2 3 4
IiiIl 99!II991 99!
12!2j99J2! si991




I212! 99! 21 951 99!
21 I I I I I I
I 99! 591 2!2!212!
I99$99! 2! 212$2!
I1! U 991II SSj99!
I2!2! 99!2! 99! 991
31 I I I I I
I 99!95$ 2121212!
I991 991 2!4!6! 51
I 991 99!99199$59j 99!




I 991 99!'II 18$ L4160!
Iii1! 99!ii 55199!
I2!2! 9512! 99!991
SI I I I I I
I21 991 2!2!2!2!
I 2!59! 215!2!2!
Iii1! 991ii 9I 99$
I2!5! 99121 95!99!




1. HCH2. EPA3. LIVERPOOL4. VAR 5.OECD6. LINK
Key to Cells:
[]"1",if converges under Rule I. "99" otherwise.
[J
Numberof steps to convergence. "99" if niorthan90.
"2"if converges underRule II."99"otherwise.
Numberof steps to convergence. "99" if more than 90.where both agencies know the true model, it frequently happens that
neither Assignment Rule is stable, or that both are.37
37T1e standard problem can produce this result if policy actions
are taken in continuous time instead of discrete time.
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